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Abstract
This essay reviews the decision-making process that led to India
exploding a nuclear device in May, 1974. An examination of the
Analytic, Cybernetic and Cognitive Theories of decision, will enable a
greater understanding of the events that led up to the 1974 test.
While each theory is seen to be only partially useful, it is only by
synthesising the three theories that a comprehensive account of the
1974 test can be given.
To achieve this analysis, literature on decision-making in national
security issues is reviewed, as well as the domestic and international
environment in which involved decisionmakers operated. Finally, the
rationale for the test in 1974 is examined.
The conclusion revealed is that the explosion of a nuclear device
by India in 1974 was primarily related to improving Indian international
prestige among Third World countries and uniting a rapidly disintegrating
Indian societal consensus. In themselves, individual decision-making
theories were found to be of little use, but a combination of the various
elements allowed a greater comprehension of the events leading up to the
test than might otherwise have been the case.
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Introduction
The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the
observer--often, indeed, to the decider himself .... There
will always be the dark and tangled stretches in the decision-
making process--mysterious even to those who may be most intimately
involved.
John Fitzgerald Kennedy
Individuals make decisions and are affected by other people's
decisions. every "doa·y. How these decisions are made, then "is atopic of
the times" in which we 1ive. 1 On May 18th, 1974 a culmination of many
decisi'ons taken over many years, India tested a nuclear device . Much
debate has resulted concerning the peaceful and/or military implications
of the test. This essay, by analysing the processes of decision that led
up to the test, attempts to untangle the decision-making process that led
to India exploding a nuclear2device in 1974.
There have been four major border conflicts in South Asia since
World War II. All of these involved India, fighting Pakistan three times
and China once. In 1964 China exploded a nuclear device and soon after
began deploying nuclear weapons. Since that time there has been much
discussion as to possible nuclear proliferation in South Asia. The Indian
test in 1974 fuelled this debate, raising the spectre that India would
also deploy nuclear weapons. In 1985 the debate on nuclear proliferation
in South Asia has once again been the focus of global attention with
rumours (probably unfounded) that Pakistan will soon be able to deploy
nuclear weapons. Thus, nuclear proliferation in South Asia, for whatever
purpose remains a topic of concern for individuals interested in inter-
8
9national affairs.
In attempting to explain India's decision to explode a nuclear
device for non-military reasons in May, 1974 three principal theories of
decision-making can be considered. While these theories are widely applied
in many areas of scholarly study, their use in explaining issues of national
security has been largely undertaken in relation to United States foreign
policy. This has resulted mainly because decision-making theories centred
on national security issues have been developed in the U.S.A. It is natural,
therefore, that most models have been constructed and tested with examples
of American foreign policy in mind. 3 American expectations, goals,
geographical location and way of life are not universally shared.
The literature review of the three major theories of decision-making
immediately follows this introduction. Because each theory in part
remedies the weaknesses bf the others, no one theory alone offers a compel-
ling explanation. However, the contradictory logic implicit in the
Analytic, Cybernetic and Cognitive Theories does not allow for the t,hree
to be used together as an explanatory tool. It is with this in mind that
Janice Stein and Raymond Tanter developed the Constrained Rationality
4
Model. The Constrained Rationality Model's great strength is that it
accepts that different degrees of synthesis of each model will be
necessary, depending on the particular issue being examined.
If it is accepted that there· is no blueprint for explaining decisions,
it must be asked whether there is any useful gain to be had from further
scholarly interest in decision-making processes. This author argues that
there undoubtedly is--only by applying all three theories of decision
can a comprehensive account of an issue emerge. The study of decision-
making "will drive political analysis deeper than it would otherwise
5go. "
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A brief and exaggerated example follows of how the three theories of
decision may enable the reader to better understand the complicated
process of decision-making. The purely analytic' 'researcher of a thesis
would be expected to know what his goals of research were before he
began. He would be expected to analyse all material and facts relevant to
his chosen subject. He would then be expected to integrate all relevant
information into his research paper. The conclusion that he arrived at
would be the result of weighing up the various argu~ments for and against.
~
The final choice would be that argu~ment which had the most documented
~
support. Let it be said that this author has not been, and could not be
purely analytic.
The cybernetic researcher would be constrained by the problem of
defining which material was relevant. Further, he would be limited by
the amount of information actually available--reliance upon various acces-
sible sources and personnel would limit the amount of material available.
Only this information could then be integrated into the research paper.
There would also be some doubt as to the student's integration capabilities.
Thus, because individuals do not have great powers of calculation needed
to integrate the information, the final conclusions would be limited in
scope.
The cognitive researcher, while still reliant upon the same sources
of information as the cybernetic student, would limit his search to those
articles he expected to be useful. He would have an approximation of
his conclusion in mind before starting research, and would access only
those sources that could be expected to support his initial thoughts.
other information would be excluded.
The researcher constrained by rationality would synthesise the
above theories. Only that information he chose to access would be
included in the research paper. However, he would probably look for
discrepant arguements in order to balance the paper. Finally, he would
conclude on the side with the most documented support, but this would be
based on the original sources he decided to access.
The pages that follow offer the reader the opportunity to gauge
the pertinence of decision-making and this author's much more modest
attempts of analysing it.
11
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Chapter I
Literature Review
What is a decision? John Steinbrunerc1aims "A decision ... is a choice
made by either an individual or a group (and it matters which) in pursuit
1
of some purpose." The purpose or objective of a decision distinguishes
it from casual occurences. For every decision there is a present and a
future and thus
Decision making is a process that selects a problem for decision
(ie choice) and provides a limited number of alternatives, from
among which a ~articular alternative is selected for implementation
and execution.
The decision-making process outlined above applied to the complex
decision requires that two or more values are affected by the decision.
This implies a value trade-off, and because pareto-optimality is
illusory, greater return of one value can only be obtained at the loss
to another. Secondly, uncertainty is part of the dynamic environment in
which decisions are taken, causing the imperfect transmission and pro-
cessing of information. Finally, the power of decision is not concentrated
in a single individual or organisational unit.
National security issues undoubtedly fulfill the conditions of a
complex decision process. While there are many definitions of national
security in circulation, most would include the need for a state to main-,
tain territorial, cultural and economic sovereignty over time. Since these
are often inseparable, trade-offs must occur. For example, providing
a credible military defense will inevitably cost considerable sums of
money. This may adversely affect a country's economic stability. A
13
military alliance with a neighbour might reduce the financial cost, but
possibly at the expense of complete military sovereignty.
The modern international system with over 160 states pursuing their
own goals and avoiding identified calamities in a dynamic environment,
causes a degree of uncertainty, if not anarchy. In order to operate
efficiently in such a climate the decisionmaker requires perfect infor-
mation. However, this is rarely possible in the real world. For example,
if it is impossible for a country with the economic and military resources
of the United States to collect all relevant information, or adequately
process received information, the problems for a relatively inexperienced
statp with much more limited resources, such as India, are multiplied.
There is built-in uncertainty in which national security decisionmakers
act. They cannot be certain whether an unanticipated outcome will occur.
Nor can they be sure that the rules of the game will remain the same.
Steinbruner labels this phenomenon "structural uncertainty.,,3
Finally, the complex decision is compounded by the fact that there
is rarely a single decision-making unit in matters of national security.,
The more likely scenario is a collection of individuals with competing
interests. For example, a politician may perceive a field manoeuvre
and its e.ffects differently from a military person. Thus, a "poorly
defined environment" in which "the pertinent options and their relevant
consequences often are not identified,,4 characterise the complex climate
in which national security decisions are taken.
To overcome the complex and uncertain environment in which they
5
operate, decisionmakers are said to use a 'five step typology' in their
f d ·· 6process 0 eC1Slon:
1. Diagnosis
The first step is to diagnose their problem and determine what
14
is at issue. This defining of the boundary of the problem sets
the scene for subsequent activity.
2. Search
Next comes the process of obtaining and sharing information and
options which may have to be constructed to fit the problem.
3. Revision
In order to remain sensitive to a dynamic environment, revision is
undertaken to update estimates in response to new information.
4. Evaluation
The examination of "relationships within the available information
7
and assessing the appropriateness of alternative options"
characterises the process of evaluation undertaken by the
decisionmaker in order to simplify complexity.
5. Choice
"Through search revision and evaluation, policymakers structure
and simplify the decisional environment as a prelude to choice."B
Decisionmakers need strategies and guidelines to make their final
choice even after the processes of search, revision and evaluation have
taken place. As a consequence, decision rules exist but vary from issue to
issue. The British legal system requires jurors to "acquit if in doubt."
There is no clear decision rule in matters of national security, but
decisionmakers involved in this area often use "worst case" logic, as it is
best to plan to meet the worst case scenario imaginable than run the risk
of a breach in national security. It is better to be safe than sorry.
This is often referred to as the conservative planning principle.
Attempting to explain the ways decisionmakers seek to reduce uncer-
tainty and simplify the complex env~ronment in which they operate, the
analytic, cybernetic and cognitive theories- employ a different process of
15
diagnosis: search, revision and evaluation. These different processes
ultimately produce diverse decision rules leading to choice. As Table I
shows these different processes are the essentially distinguishing char-
acteristics of the models which will be discussed at length below.
Table I Explanations of the Process of Choice*
Analytic Theory Cybernetic Theory
Model I Model II,Model III
Cognitive Theory Constrained
Model IV Rationality
Model V
Diagnosis Unspecified.
Search Across all
relevant
options.
Revision Optimal.
Evaluation Comparative
calculation of
cost, benefit,
and likeli-
hood of
principal
consequences
of alterna-
tives.
Preselected and
validated
indicators.
Progranuned con-
sideration of a
preselected num-
ber of variables.
Incremental and
conservative.
Limited; reliance
on pre analysed
s.o.p. or
programs.
Indicatars
derived from
belief system.
Within the
parameters of
belief system ..
Deductive and
categorical in-
ferences, sharp
oscilation from
low probability
to certainty.
Limited;
sequential
along one or
two dimensions.
Indicators
derived from
belief system.
Wit.hin the
parameters of
belief system.
Same as Model
IV but un-
defined body
of data will
alter
opinions.
Analytic cost,
benefit cal
culation along
one or two
dimensions.
Choice Optimising. Satisficing, Single-value
criterion,
analogising,
lexicogra-phic
calculus.
Optimising
the goals
of the
decisionmaker
ie constrained
optimising.
* This table is largely based on Table 3:1 in J. Stein and R. T~nter
(1980), p. 65.
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There has been much debate, often resulting in confusion over the
use of various terms within the scholarly treatment of decision-making. 9
In order to simplify this debate the following discussion will be limited
to the use of models and theories.
It is important to differentiate between models and theories.
Models are a simplification of reality; they represent it imperfectly. A
model can be generally defined as an analytic system "devised or construc-
ted so that the logical relationships between its elements correspond
in logical form to the relationships between a set of elements in the
10
observable world." A theory, on the other hand, refers "to a 'system
of locially related, empirically testable lawlike propositions."ll It
12is often argued that the distinction between models and theories is
mere pedantics. However, the lack of empirical content does not allow
models to directly generate explanation or prediction about the observable
world, unlike theories. It is the predictive qualities of the Rational and
13Cybernetic Theories that distinguish them from their component models.
One or more models may make up a theory. The analytic model (Model
I on Table I) subscribes to the principles of rationality. Its orig,ins are
to be found in various natural and social science disciplines, but was
first applied as a theory of foreign policy decision-making by Glenn
S d k d S · 14ny er, N.W. Bruc an B.M. apln.
The Cybernetic Theory incorporates Models II, III and IV as shown
on Table I. Model II which Graham Allison labels the Organisational
d 1 15 · fl · 1Process mo e, emphaslses the in uence of organisatlona routines on
decisions made by organisations (Government Ministries are in this sense,
organisations). Organisations are expected to work efficiently and thus
use analytic logic. In the real world this is not the case as causal
learning and cybernetic information processing are not analytic. 16 Model
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II, then, is labelled eybernetic. Model III, Bureaucratic or Governmental
politics,17 is Allison's account of how the leaders of government units
compete with one another in policy formation and implementation.
Steinbruner claims to have supplemented Allison's Models II and III
with the cognitive Model of decision (Model IV) .18 Models II and III
\
suggest issues of national security are dealt with in a "highly structured
d "1 d" ,,19an approprlate y arrange envlronment. steinbruner rejects this,
and "suggests a source of supplementation; namely a set of principles
about the operation of the human mind .... Cybernetic theory thus
supplemented ... offers a base paradigm for political analysis competitive
"th h t" 1 "t" .. 20Wl t e ra lona POSl lone
In adopting Thomas KUhn's2l concept of a paradigm, Steinbruner makes it
difficult to accept such a statement. Both Allison and Steinbruner used
analytic logic in the construction of their ,respective models and accept
that in certain circumstances the analytic model of decision is useful.
For Kuhn, there can be no competing dominant paradigms: a new paradigm
22is incompatible with its predecessor.
d 1 d f " "d 'd 23"Mo e V is rawn rom Janlce Steln an Raymon Tanter's notlon
of constrained rationality, which attempts to synthesise the four previous
models of decision as a realistic reflection of the environment in which
national security decisionmakers operate. More specifically it attempts
to reintroduce elements of the analytic model back into decisionmaking
explanations.
h "I d 1
24 f ""T e Ratlona Actor Mo e 0 DeclSlon
The classical analytic model has long been regarded as portraying
the method by which all decisions are arrived at. It is only in the last
few decades that the incompleteness of the explanation of decision processes
18
expounded in the classical model, has enc'ouraged the development of supple-
mentary models.
In its purest form the model predicts that a decisionmaker will
always choose the option which is rational,25 that is the option that best
achieves his set of hierarchically arranged goals. It assurnesthat decision-
makers possess perfect knowledge in the search, revision and evaluation
stages, and that they will seek to maximise ach~evement of goals in the
process of choice. However, this fails to take account of the complex and
uncertain environment in· which decisionmakers, particularly those concerned
with issues of national security, operate. In order to give a more realistic
account of decision--making, it is necessary to relax the central assump-
tions of the classic model. This is often referred to as the analytic
model, as it accepts the problem of objective rationality during the process
ofdecisioh. 'Analytic' also stresses the internal logic inherent to the
Rational Actor Model (RAM) of decision.
A decision can only be considered analytic once analysis in retrospect
has identified the conseqUences in relation to the expected goal attainment
at the time of decision. The analytic model is a more useful method to
evaluate standards of performance than as an explanation of choice.
Accordingly, the process by which a problem is identified is unspecified
by Model I. Search is expected to be carried out across all relevant options,
yet it is not specified as to how extensive this should be. Minimal search
across the consequences of only one option cannot realistically be labelled
analytic. However, failure to limit search to relevant options will
produce a delay in the evaluation of options already at hand. Because there
are no set limits to the boundary of search in the analytic model, there is
a tendency to concentrate on the processes of revision and evaluation.
The degree to whichdecisionmakersare sensitive over time to"new
It is
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information, and their subsequent revision of estimates of likely outcomes
" " t t "d" t f th 1 t" "of chol"ce. 26lS an lmpor an ln lca or 0 e ana y lC processlng
important to remember that the environment in which decisionmakers operate
is not only uncertain, but dynamic. It is therefore essential that
decisionmakers be prepared to revise and update their estimates in response
to incoming information: that is, to learn by causal inferences. However,
it is difficult to specify the direction and scope of revision until a post-
mortem can be undertaken. The level of revision required is highly
context-dependent in matters of national security. The amount of incoming
information will likely be immense and, as will become apparent below,
there will be a need to "filter" much of this information and decide
d " " " t h d 27which new information has a lrect bearing on the sltuatl0n a an .
It is important to point out that analytic decisionmakers should be
"sensitive to ambiguity or contradiction m.n the mnL.de.nce a.nd oo.ns.i.der,mure
than one interpretation of the ambiguities they do identify .. ,,28
Allison identifies this point well.. During the Cuban missile crisis
the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Ex-Com)
questioned the estimate provided by the United states Air Force (U.S.A.F.)
that to remove the Soviet missiles by surgical air strike would require
500 sorties with only a 90 percent effectiveness in destroying them,
and would cause extensive civilian destruction. Ex-Com members were
bewildered by such estimates. It soon became apparent that the U.S.A.F.
estimates were based on a massive air strike against Cuban targets
previously considered to be threats to u.S. security, not just a surgical
air strike to remove the bases only. As the crisis continued, the U.S.A.F.,
at the request of Ex-Com, drew up new estimates that took into account new
information, and the surgical air strike became a live option that was to
be implemented if the naval blockade failed. 29
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While the processes of defining the problem, searching for information
and revision are not clearly delimited, the evaluation process, by contrast,
is simple for the analytic decisionmaker. Quite simply, the decisionmaker
uses a form of cost benefit analysis in deciding which alternatives are
useful. The benefits that are expected to accrue from one alternative are
weighed against the expected costs. For example, failure by a country to
sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1970) may result in widespread
international criticism, but allows them to increase their defence options. 30
As with all cost benefit analysis, there is a problem of value complex-
ity. There is no common-denominator or yardstick with which to measure
national security and international prestige. The analytic decisionmaker
accepts,therefore, that value complexity exists and that there is a need
for value trade-offs. It is assumed that the decisionmaker has a hierar_
chically arranged set of goals which he wishes to attain. Thus, by not
signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a country accepts the fact
that such a non-action might reduce its international prestige. This
tends to be seen as an acceptable loss of face because of the retained
right to build a nuclear deterrent.
Attempting to calculate the costs and benefits of each option and its
likely consequences will necessarily be limited because of time and financial
cost. Such definition will pe subjective, as will the decision as to how
extensive the cost-benefit analysis should be. The initial hier~chical
ordering of goals will be a similarly subjective process undertaken by
the analytic decisionmaker. This loss of objectivity in the evaluation
process is not considered seriously detrimental: it merely reflects the
complex and uncertain environment in which the analytic decisionmaker
operates.
The analytic decisionrnaker is now ready to make a decision. The
21
decisionmaker is expected to follow the rule of discounting "the value of
each option by the likelihood of its consequences and selecting the option
31
which promises the highest expected value." The decisionmaker will
choose the option which is the best possible one under the circumstances
in attaining his hierachically determined set of goals. However,
understanding, much less performing such a calculation)is regarded by many
as beyond most decisionmaker's ability--especially at the national security
level. 32Kelley suggests that decisionmakers possess the capacity of
intuitive statisticians, while others suggest a capacity to successfully
approximate value trade-offs.
The rational actor model of decision served as the dominant perspec-
tive in the discipline for many decades, despite its inherent weaknesses
as a method of explanation. This was particularly true for national
security issues. Because its key assumptions are questionable there is a
need to develop different approaches that overcome the problems of the
Rational Actor Model. The most obvious problem lies in the assumption that
the state is characterised as a single, autonomous, ~nified decision-
making body. The modern state is a complex conglomeration of interests rarely
reflecting the characteristics of an individual person ascribed to it by
the Model I analyst. As Allison notes "this simplification must not be
allowed to conceal the fact that a government consists of a conglomeration
of semi feudal loosely allied organisations, each with a substantial life
. 33
of its own."
Secondly, it is difficult for an individual, let alone a state, to
1 f I d I h ·· · 34agree upon a hiera~hica set 0 goa s an va ues t at lt asplres to attaln.
If it could be agreed that national security is at the top of priorities
for a state, is it possible to adequately delimit national security?
Is this territorial, political or economic security? In an extreme example,
adopting the option which
22
it may be preferable to accept foreign domination in order to avoid being
annihilated by nuclear warfare.
Closely associated with this is the assumption that decisionmakers
work to maximise goal attainment at the least cost: they optimise as a
decision rule. This is usually a short sighted strategy as it fails to
take account of the long term effects it might
The Cybernetic Models of Decision
Models II, III and IV comprise the Cyber~etic Theory of decision as
developed by John Steinbruner concerning issues of national security.
Before analysing the models in detail, it is necessary to outline the
cybernetic process of decision in a more general way.
f " d 1 db" 35 d f" dCybernetics was 1rst eve ope y N,. W1ener, an was con1rme
36in the study of politics by Karl Deutsch. Cybernetics is the science of
effective organisation and the "information mechanisms associated with
behavioral" aspects of thinking.,,37 The Cybernetic Theory of decisions
atms to reduce uncertainty arid simplify the environment in which decision-
makers operate.
A problem is diagnosed by preselected and validated indicators.
Revision is an incremental process and is accordingly limited. Evaluation
is similarly limited, relying on pre-analysed standard operating procedures.
h d "" 1" f' t" f"" ,38T e ' eC1Slon ru e 1S one 0 sa 1S 1c1ng :
first comes to light that satisfies the needs of the decisionmaker.
Model II
Model II is based on organisation theory--an area of study covering
39
many social science disciplines that began ostensibly in the 1930's.
In principle, a change in the level of analysis from the individual to the
collectivity does not change the form of analysis. An organisation
23
r'
could conceivably possess a set of hier~chically ordered goals with a single
",
decision-mak~ng centre. It is possible to think of an organisation as
merely a more knowledgeable and consistent entity than the individual.
However, in the real world organisations are only occasionally seen to be
acting in an analytic manner.
· · 1 h' .' 40 d d·' 'Organ1.Satlona t eorlsts have a opte ' Herbert Slmon: S c~ncept of
bounded rationality. Analytic choice requires the generation of all
possible alternatives (Search: see Table I), the assessment of the
probabilities of all consequences of each alternative (revision), and the
evaluation 6f each set of consequences for all relevant goals (evaluation).
This is no small order for an individual requiring "powers of prescience
"TheThus, models that simplify reality are required.
and capacities for computation resembling those we usually attribute to
God. ,,41
physical and psychol'ogical limits of mal1' s capacity as alternative generator,
information processor, and problem solver cons:train the decision-making
'42processes of individuals and organisations." Added to this are indivi-
duals'parochial outlook and personal ambitions within an organisation.
Thus, organisation'al processes fundamentally alter the nature of decisions
which come from organisations as opposed to those mad~.. by individuals.
43Richard Cyert and James March developed Simon s bounded. rationality
as a criticism of the classic theory of the firm in the study of
Economics. They complemented existing criticism of the firm by focusing
on the effect of organisational structure and conventional practise upon the
development of goals, the formation of expectations, and the execution of
choice.
1 · d' 1 ,44 d· d ' t' h 1Char es Lln b om's notion of ',is]ointe lncrementa lonsas a so
been transferred from the individual to the organisational level of de-
cision. 45 Within an organisation there existsemi~autonomousdepartments
24
staffed by individuals. Each individual works to "clear his desk," often
with no obvious idea of the organisation's goals, but knowing whic~ disasters
to avoid. The decisions made by each individual serve to assure the
organisation continues to function, but in no certain direction. Thus
incrementalism "change by small steps" in a disjointed manner characterises
an organisation "muddling along" with no obvious direction or eMnd to the
process in sight ("not yet through"). 46
It is from this basis that Allison explains Model II, the Organisational
Processes Model, as a method of explaining government actions. Government
action is not the result of choice as suggested by Model I, but of or-
ganisational output.
Foreign policy is the result of organisational processes in three
important ways. Firstly, actual occurences are the result of organisational
actions. Allison highlights this point by referring to the Soviet decision to
base missiles in Cuba in 1962. In order to undertake such an action there
had to be in existence already a unit of the Soviet state apparatus
capable of fullfilling such a task. Secondly, the "knowhow" to undertake
such a mission was needed: by emplacing the missiles, the Soviet Air
Defence Command merely applied standard operating procedures learned
during previous work in the Soviet Union; the only difference being that
the missile bases were to be outside the Soviet Union. Finally, once the
"high politics" decision had been made to base missiles in Cuba, the Air
Defence Command was unhindered by politicians in its method of carrying
out the orders. The Soviet Air Command "did what it knew how to do" with
little communication with other organisations, for example the GRU and
KGB, involved in the missile deployment process. 47
From this example we can see how the outputs of government, especially
with respect to foreign policy, may be the result of organisational
25
activity. Writing on American foreign policy, Theodore Sorenson noted
that "Presidents rarely, if ever, make decisions particularly in foreign
affairs, in the sense of writing their conclusions on a clean slate
The basic decisions which confine their choices have all too often been
48
previously made."
In order, therefore, better to comprehend the governance of modern
societies by governments through bureaucratic organisations, it is necessary
to more fully understand the methods used by organisations to arrive at a
decision.
The method by which a problem is identified is relatively simple for
the Model II analyst:
Analysis has been done long before the fact and decisionmakers are
expected to monitor only a limited number of preselected variables.
Only when change occurs in one of these i~~icators, when some failure
is registered do they diagnose a problem.
Search is not extensive nor comprehensive. Because much organisational
work is routine, it can be undertaken by referring to past procedures in
dealing with an event. These are known as standard operating procedures
(S.O.P.'s). If the existing repertoires or S.Q.P.'s fail to deal with an
event, these S.O.P.'s will be adjusted marginally so they are able to take
account of the new situation. Thus a system of con~trained learning is
apparent throughout the Cybernetic Theory of decision. Search is under-
taken by trial and error and will be precluded as soon as the anomaly is
overcome.
The process of revision is similarly focused. The existing structure
of the organisation screens new information by accepting only new inputs
via its existing information channels. Relevant information that is not
picked up by the existing information channels will not be processed in
revising the estimates of likely outcomes. Integrating new information
26
with existing data is, therefore, limited and thus simplifies the decision-
maker's calculations.
Because the process of search is not extensive, the process of evaluation
also tends to be simplistic for the cybernetic decisionmaker: "Evaluation
ia limited to the c~sideration of the next option in the response set. n50
The decision rule is, therefore, equally uncomplicated. If the standard
operating procedures do not adequately deal with a problem, then these
procedures will be modified unt'il" they satisfy the decisionmakers'
minimum needs.. Satisficing, rather than optimising'; is the trade mark of
the Model II analyst, a distinguishing feature from the analytic decision-
maker. If the stew-is too thick, the chef adds a little more water, if
it is too thin he adds more flour. The cybernetic decisionmaker may not
understand (or care for) the reason for his process of choice, because "it
is not the reason but the result that counts. uSl
Developing a previously referred to example amplifies the satisficing
decision rule inherent in the Cybernetic Theory of decision. The
U.S.A.F. was requested by the Executive Committee of the National Security
Council (Ex-Com) to provide an estimate for a surgical air strike against
Soviet nuclear missile bases in Cuba in 1962.
It later became apparent that the process of search by the U.S.A.F.
consisted of consulting its files and pulling out a pre-conceived plan which
incorporated the Air Forces' role in any full scale American invasion
of its island neighbour. To this was added the new information of
the Soviet missile bases, and a revised estimate of 500 sorties with only a
90 percent likely success rate. Reliance upon U.S.A.F. S.Q.P.'s in the
process of search limited the process of evaluation by Ex-Com resulting
in the surgical air strike no longer being
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a li\le option at that time. The U.S.A.F. had merely adapted a previous
repertoire to include new information; it had not undertaken a wider search,
but had been prepared to choose the first option which satisfied the require-
ments, as they perceived them, of the Ex'-Com ..
Model II has been successfully applied in many areas of the Social
Sciences--but mainly in areas of administrative studies. There have been
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some attempts to analyse organisational theory in studies of government,
but Allison's was one of the first to apply organisational theory to
matters of foreign policy decision-making. The deployment of Soviet
missiles in Cuba in a manner in which they could hardly fail to be observed,
and the imposition of a u.s. Naval blockade in a manner contrary to that
ordered by President Kennedy suggest that "the compelling cognitive and
cybernetic perspectives explain quite naturally and directly those events
which are most puzzling when understood within a rational framework."S3
Government actions as a result of organisational outputs represented
little that was new in organisation theory when Allison's book was pUblished
in 1971, except that it was applied to the Cuban missile crisis. However,
Model II was only a prelude for Allison to the development of Model III.
While Model II accounts for the routine workings of governmental bodies, it
fails to take into consideration the influence of politicians in the
diagnosis and evaluation processes of decision.
Model III
Government is made up of many organisations (ministries, departments,
etc.) :
The leaders who sit on top of organisations are not a monolithic
group. Rather, each individual in this group is, in his own right,
a player in a central competitive game. The name of the game is
Politics; bargaining along regularised circuits-among players positioned
hier~chicallywithin the government. 54
6\
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Model III uses Model II as abuilding block in that it accepts many
of the procedures of organisational processes, but attempts to bring it into
the 'real' world where governmental actions are political resultants.
This is a time of large change whereby "the introduction through public
policy of what is considered to be a new and important element (in the
combination of elements to which people refer in explaining important
social change) .,,55 Braybrooke and Lindblom stress that such high politic
decisions result in uncertain outcomes. 56
It is those who sit on top of organisations that decide which infor-
mation channels must be monitored, and thus define the preselected
variables from which problems may be diagnosed. When an issue is confronted,
politicians delegate the processes of search and revision to those govern-
mental organisations they believe have a part to play: they factor the
problem.
Model II processes of search and revision occur. It is stage IV,
evaluation)that emphasises the working of governments as different from
normal organisational processes outlined in Model II.
The process of evaluation for the Model III analyst occurs when senior
bureaucrats and politicians clash. Groupings and coalitions may subse-
quently emerge.
The people and groups are players who focus not on strategic issues
but on many diverse intra-national problems as well; players who
act in terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather
according to va5~ous conceptions of national, organisational and
personal goals.
As to how a decision emerges, R. Hilsman explains,,':'the, Xielative power
of these different groups and people included is as relevant to the final
decision as the group of goals they seek or the cogency and wisdom of their
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arguements."
In the United states, Model III can be seen as particularly applic-
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able where "separate institutions sharing power" characterise the political
system rather than a separation of powers among institutions, according
to Richard Neustadt. The perennial interservice rivalry over the u.s.
defence budget is legendary and illustrates the point well. The Army,
the Navy and the Air Force each fights at least to maintain, if not increase
their percentage of the annual defence budget. The. virulent debate over
the B36 bomber with Admiral Radford testifying to congressional hearings
it was a tlbad gamble with national security" and Air Force Secretary Syming-
.ton declaring the use of "a B36and an A bomb could save a lot of time
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and lives in the destroying of a distant target" serves as a prominent
example. President Eisenhower, acknowledging the conflict, described
Radford and Symington as "distinguished Americans who have their country's
60good at heart."
There can be little doubt that the axiom "where you stand depends
on where you sit" reflects inter-governmental bargaining and gives poignancy
to then Secretary of State, J. Forrestal's remark ... "I have always been
amused by those who say they are quite willing to go into government but
they are not willing to go into politics. My answer ... is that you can no
more 'divorce goverrunent from politics than you can separate sex from crea-
<,,61tlon.
Graham Allison accepts that the basis for Model III came from Richard
Neustadt's Presidential Power. While Allison agrees with Neustadt that
"government leaders have competitive, not homogenous interests" Allison
is incorrect in claiming that their "priorities and perceptions are shaped
62by positions" alone. Model II and Model III, a cognitive theorist would
argue, especially at the highest levels of. government, leaves out the ability
of the individual to make inferential decisions without ahy apparent
prompting. This ability is shaped by the individual's belief system:
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"Fortunately for purposes of analysis, the structure of human beliefs is
far less varied over individuals and cultures than is the fantastically
diverse content of those beliefs.,,6
Model IV
Neustadt explained how it came to be that President Eisenhower's
Secretary of the Treasury in 1957 warned of a "depression that will curl
your hair' if the Congress did not cut the Administration's budget proposals
64it had received that day. While Secretary of the 'Treasury is a powerful
position from which to shape the administration's budget, George M.
Humphrey was unable to exert this power. Neustadt's explanation of this
apparent contradiction)and also his account of General MacArthur's dismissal
by President Truman at the height of the General's popularity, fo~ the
basis of the cognitive decision-making model. However, the underlying
assumptions were first formulated into a model a decade later by John
t · b 65S eln runer.
Steinbruner praises Models II and III because they are simple and
effective if used in the correct environment. However, he notes that
public policy formulation, and particularly foreign policy formulation
does not occur in "a highly structured appropriately arranged environ-
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ment." Further,
the Cybernetic Paradigm projects a view of the human mind (clearly
the ultimate locus of decisffion-making) which does not account for
one of its most critical facultieg7-the ability to make inductiveinferences on its own initiative.
Cognitive Theory analyses how human beings structure their beliefs; and
as a supplement to Cybernetic Theory offers a major alternative to the
rational theory of decision. Stein and Tanter take a different view,
claiming that only by relaxing central assumptions of analytic and
31
cybernetic theory can cognitive theory be taken into account. 68
It is the structure of the mind and its apparent resolve to overcome
ambiguity by inference that forms the" basis of Model IV. Some of the
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cognitive theorists' underlying assumptions are debatable, but because
its approach is "bold" in the Popperian sense and does appear to be useful
in certain circumstances, it is worthy of further discussion.
Steinbruner argues that the mind's apparent ability to construct
relationships between beliefs and organise the manner in which information
is processed in reference to existing beliefs "essentially promise to
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explain how decisions under complexity become structured."
A belief system then is IVa configuration of ideas and attitudes in
which elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional
interdependence.,,7l Cognitive theorists argue that "there are regularities
in cognitive operations, known to a significant extent through laboratory
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experiments, which powerfully condition the decision process." From
this, Steinbruner argues, we can identify principles shaping the belief
system of individuals.
Firstly, there are both hierachical and lateral relationships in
memory. People tend to remember the overall concept of something or some
event, but are not certain of the details. For example, if asked to recall
Adolf Hitler's part in history, an individual will likely detail Hitler
as leader of the German people in the 1930's'before stating his actions
causing World War II. Lateral associations between hierarchically organised
concepts within memory also exist, but are not well understood.
The second principle of cognitive theory is that of cognitive
consistency. Adelbert Ames demonstrated how human beings work to overcome
an anomaly in their beliefs. The now famous experiment of an individual
walking across a trapezoidal room, and apparently changing in height to
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an unfamiliar observer, emphasises how an observer will perceive the subject's
height to change, rather than identifying the otherwise square room as
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the anomaly. When the observer is a close friend of the subject, a
greater effort is made to understand the shape of the room as the anomaly.
Cognitive psychologists have suggested existing attitudes will change
so as to remove or reduce the inconsistent information, or an alternative
1 8 811 b · 74exp anatlon Wl e glven.
The third principle, reality, simply asserts that the human mind is
in contact with its environment; that stable, important features of the
environment impose themselves on the mind. 75 Reality, therefore, in
important ways constrains the operations of the mind.
The final two principles, simplicity and stability, underlt~_much of
cognitive theory. Simplicity is achieved by keeping thought processes as
simple as possible--almost a tunnel vision. Stability is achieved by re-
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sisting "changes in the core structure of belief," much as Lakatos
argued that it is acceptable to alter the surrounding body of hypothesis,
77but the hard core assumptions of a theory cannot be altered.
From this basis we can clearly identify the distinguishing features
of Model IV from its predecessors. "Decisionmakers are not trial-and-
error learners as the behaviouralists would have it, but active partici-
pants in problem construction and problem solving.,,78 Cognitive psycholo-
gists go further and question the logic of arguement and the rationality
of estimation and underline their boundaries. Decisionmakers organise
and interpret available information through their belief systems. The
process of diagnosing a problem is thus located in their belief system.
A problem becomes apparent when a conflict between individuals arises.
Essentially, two or more belief systems clash. Thereafter, a process
of search will be undertaken, but this will be limited not only by the
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number and quality of information channels, 'but also by the parameters
of the searcher's belief system. The ~ecisionmakerwill only search for
options in areas that he has already accepted as relevant.
The revision of estimates is similarly limited. New information will
be screened by the decisionmaker·to see if it supports his belief system.
If incoming information increases uncertainty by being anomalous to the
decisionmaker's belief system, it will likely be excluded. This allows for
deductive inferences on the part of the decisionmaker leading to sharp
oscillation from low probability to certainty if new information supports
original beliefs. The calculating of likely consequen~es will thus be
simple. There will usually be only one or two live options which are built
up through the processes of limited search and revision and are not con-
tradictory to the decisiorrmaker's belief system. In the process of evaluation
there is a tendency to underestimate the likelihood of undesirable conse-
quencesand overestimate the likelihood of valued outcomes--that is, wishful
thinking.
We have noted the cognitive thinker's ability to screen out unwanted
information, while there is room for alteration in the belief system if
incoming information is overwhelmingly contradictory, although this is
rarely the case. For example, the normal intelligence gathering
organs used by the u.s. State Department suggested in September 1962
that the Soviets may be emplacing missiles in Cuba. General opinion at
the time was that the Soviet Union would not dare to undertake such a
provocative and difficult operation. Thus, the contrary reports were
either excluded or explained away as buildings for other purposes. It
was the explicit reconnaissance pictures taken by u.S. spy planes in
mid-October that caused senior members of the Kennedy Administration to
alter their belief that the Soviet Union would indeed emplace missiles
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. 79ln Cuba.
Unlike the analytic or cybernetic models of decision there is no
single decision rule implicit to Model IV. There may be a lexicographic
elimination of options related to dimensions of value ranking previously
prepared. If there remains more than one live option after this, a resort
to decisions by analogy may be undertaken. This involves choosing the
option that has worked in the past and had results which reinforced the
dominant belief system. If a decision appears to be too complicated for
choice, the decisionmaker may just avoid or postpone the decision.
The Constrained Rationality Model. Model V.
The four previous models developed from criticisms of their
forerunners, have essentially been contrasts to other explanations of
choice. The emphasis has been on· difference. Stein and Tanter
concentrate on synthesising the three principle explanations of choice:
rational, cybernetic and cognitive. While this initially appears a step
backwards, on closer examination it is not. Allison and Steinbruner
emphasised the importance of the analytic model in the construction of
cybernetic and cognitive models of decision, respectively. Thus, Stein
and Tanter follow this line of reasoning and expand on the similarities
rather than emphasising the differences of all four previous models.
The concept of constrained rationality, though not the only synthesis
of the various models, suggest a belief system is initially extensively
used in diagnosing a problem and providing options. Decisionmakers,
particularly political leaders, tend to use modified analytic processes
of revision, evaluation and choice.
"Decisionmakers begin their process of choice by referring to
prevailing beliefs. They have no other basis. n8a The stimulus for
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decision is filtered through the decisionmaker's belief system--only
he can perceive when a decision is required. The process of search is
also dependent on the individual's belief system--it may cover a set of
obvious alternatives that are compatible to beliefs, while rejecting out of
hand alternatives which are inconsistent with the dominant belief system.
Curtailing the process of revision will be delimited for the same reason.
Evidence shows that a steady flow of contrary data to the prevalent belief
system will cause opinions to be modified. 81 Moderate cognitive theorists
accept this but considerable disagreement continues as to how much data is
required to alter a strongly held opinion.
Because the process of search is shaped by prevalent beliefs, the
process of evaluation will be similarly limited. The belief system has not
vanished, it is still apparent and will evaluate likely outcomes in a similar
method to that outlined in the cognitive model.
But, because there are a number of options, it is highly probably
that an analytic cost benefit evaluation of the remaining options will
occur, especially in national security decision. The final process of
choice will be similarly limited to the options available, that which optimises
the goals of the decisionmaker will prevail. Hence, a form of constrained
optimising occurs, constrained by the previous decisional processes.
The constrained rationality model combines elements of the cognitive
and analytic processes of decision. Accepting the human mind as the ultimate
locus of decision and its ability to make inductive inferences on its own
initiative, together with the individual's need to be consistent and rational
as that is the criterion of a normal being, we can see how prevalent
beliefs are constrained by the operating environment and how the perceived
environment is shaped by each individual.
Stein and Tanter make another important observation. While a
mixture of the various theories may be applicable for a particular
decision, it will not necessarily be applied again. Decisionmakers may
adapt their processes of choice to suit their environment and the task at
hand. The question must be asked, what now for decision-making theory
as a discipline if there is no comprehensive paradigm upon which to
build? That is beyond the scope of this studyt
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Chapter II
This chapter analyses the envirorunent in which Indian nuclear decision-
making occurred up to 1974. It attempts to reach an understanding of
IndiaJs national secuiity perceptions and how these were influenced by
the domestic political system and·Indian society. Secondly, it reviews
the level of technology required to undertake a. nuclear test, an.d the peace-
ful and military uses of nuclear explosives engineering (NEE). Finally
it tests various hypothesis as to why India exploded a nuclear device
in May, 1974.
Like all states in the contemporary international system, India
interacts with other states. If we surmise part of the reasoning behind
the nuclear test 'was to enhance India's nation.al security, we must under-
stand the regional and global envirorunentin which i t_ acted at the time 0
Indian foreign policy formulators regard India as a regional power
in South Asia, but it does have equals in the guise of the Peoples
Republic of China (P.R.C.) and possibly Indonesia. Pakistan remains a
. ..... . Ipotentlal adversary. A closer analysis of India's regional security
problems since Independence follows this introduction.
The modern term "super power" is often defined as a state that is
able to influence events in any region of the world. South Asia, as a
region, is no exception. In a world system where regional conflicts can
spread to other regions or lead to superpower involvement, and possibly
world war, it becomes necessary to understand India and South Asia as
integral participants in global affairs since World War II ..
The second section of this chapter analyses Indian society and the
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unique political system, especially the foreign and defence policy processes,
required to govern the world's most populous democracy. It was a political
decision to explode a nuclear device and it is, therefore, impmrtant
to understand the political system that shaped the decision.
The final section traces the history of nuclear energy and nuclear
explosions, and their uses. The potential uses of nuclear explosions are
then applied to India's test in order to analyse the reasoning that led to
the detonation of a nuclear device on May 18, 1974.
India in South Asia
In the modern world it is inevitable for India to be the centre of
Asia, and in that te2m I would include Australia and New Zealand,
or even East Africa.
J.P. Nehru
India and Pakistan
The same year Nehru made this claim the Indian sub-continent was)
partitioned and became independent of its British colonial rulers. The
predominantly Hindu state of India and the mainly Moslem population of
Pakistan, early and almost inevitably adversaries, were born into a world
gripped by super-power cold war which became acutely hostile during the
Korean war. While India and Pakistan both became members of the British
Commonweaith, they could not expect much economic or military aid from
their war torn former coloniser. Economic aid from Asian neighbours was
unlikely due to the general poverty of the area; local military alliances
outside of super~ower blocs could only be with each other, or with a
China that was in the throes of civil war.
Within a year of Independence the uncertain status of Kashmir led
to the first "Indo-Pak" border war. The war was caused by Pakistani
General
The World as Seen From Delhi
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1 Peoples Republic of China (P.R.C.)
2 Pakistan
3 Bangladesh (formerly E. Pakistan)
4 Burma
5 Afghanistan
6 Nepal
7 Bhutan
8 Sri Lanka
Adapted from A.K. Dutt, S.P. Chatterjee, and M.M. Geib, India in Maps
(1976), p. 3 •.
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inspired rebels fighting against the plan of Kashmiri political leaders
to accede to the All India Union. Indian troops intervened, which in
turn led to a response of mobilisation by Pakistan. Both countries
occupied parts of Kashmir, a situation that has remained since 1950 when
a cease fire between the two was agreed to.
India's relations with Pakistan generally improved during the 1950's,
but minor border clashes continued. The Sino-Indian war of 1962 left
India in a weak military position. While Pakistan could have joined China
in this war, her adequate relations with India at the time (except for
disagreement over Kashmir), reliance upon the west for military hardware
and economic support precluded any alliance with the P.R.C. 3 whose intentions
Pakistan was far from certain of. Closer relations between China and
Pakistan did occur in the mid 1960's with Heads of State exchanging visits.
Pakistan was anxious to augment its membership of Central Treaty Organisa-
tion and South East Asian Treaty Organisation with an understanding with
China concerning their mutual neighbour, India. The lack of American
support during the Indo-Pak war of 1965 forced Pakistan "to go to China to
find a means of defence against aggression.,,4 Relations between Pakistan
and China continued to improve in the late 1960's in cultural and economic
matters. On the international level China offered support for Pakistan's
claims on Kashmir and during the 1971 Indo-Pak war. In return Pakistan
promoted the P.R.C.'s claim for the China seat at the United Nations, and
was instrumental in arranging Henry Kissinger"s secret visits to Peking in
1971.
By early 1964 India felt militarily able to repel a conventional
attack from either Pakistan or China. 5 Renewed border troubles in mid
1965 over Kashmir led to India invading sections of Kashmir which had been
occupied by Pakistan since 1948. A month later, in September 1965, India
invaded West Pakistan. However, the ill-prepared and poorly equipped
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Indian defence forces encountered a determined and well armed Pakistan.
The outcome was inconclusive, but India's failure to strike a decisive
blow against her much smaller neighbour caused great alarm to the
informed Indian.
The Tashkent Agreement signed <by India "and Pakistan in January 1966
was deemed honourable.by demoralised Indian leaders. The Agreement had been
spondored by the Soviet Union, but the United states' suspicion of
arms shipments to the sub~continent in general,and Pakistan in particular,
suggested a degree of super-power parallelism in their policies towards
South Asia. The late 1960's saw a thaw in relations between Pakistan and
India, particularly as econom~cprosp-ectswere steadily rising. 6
Relations between the two nations did not deteriorate furthe-r during
the late 1960's, but conflicting claims over Kashmir still impeded serious
progress to closer links between India and Pakistan. However, in 1971
the third Ihdo-Pak war occurred.
At Independence, Pakistan included the predominantly Moslem population
on India's western border and the predominantly Bengali Moslems cocooned
in India's East. West and East Pakistan were not geographically contigious,
separated by a thousand miles of Indian territory. The economic potential
of the East was far behind that of West Pakistan, where most development
had taken place. Economic disequilibrium compounded by political and
7
social unrest in East Pakistan eventually flared into civil war. Predo-
minantly Punjabi Moslem troops were flown in from West Pakistan to contain
the civil unrest in East Pakistan. These soldiers soon came into conflict
with their Bengali Moslem East Pakistani comrades. Serious f.;i.ghting broke
out·forcing up to ten million Bengalis to flee over the border into
India. The relief effort needed to feed the refugees soon began to put a
serious strain on the already overstretched Indian economy, particularly
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in states bordering East Pakistan. These states resented the Delhi rescue
efforts and called for action by Mrs. Gandhi to halt the flow of refugees.
Mrs. Gandhi's options were largely being defined by events around
her. On December 6, 1971, Indian troops intervened in the fighting in
East Pakistan. Troop numbers in Pakistan had been seriously depleted by
their stationing in East Pakistan, and thus a threat to India from her
western border was precluded. Within twelve days Bangladesh, as East
Pakistan is now known, was "liberated" and India became the first country
to officially recognise one of the world's poorest states. India had won
a decisive military victory and had forever eradicated the possibility of
a two-front conflict with Pakistan.
Commenting on the outcome of India's intervention in the Bangladesh
civil war, Mrs. Gandhi noted "We seem to have gotten what we wanted without
8
the bomb." Pakistan was no longer considered by senior Indian defence
policy experts as a mortal enemy, merely a potentially serious thorn in
her side. 9 There was, however, a nuclear factor in this relationship.
Despite the intentions of India to detonate a nuclear device, as publicly
declared in Parliament in 1972 and again in 1973, Pakistan did not under-
take a crash nuclear development programme. Possible reasons for this
delay before 1974 might include doubting Mrs. Gandhi's rhetoric and intense
pressure from Pakistan's western allies, particularly the United states,
to abstain from nuclear development.
President Ali Bhutto's declaration following the test that it was
"nuclear blackmail," however, did not spur the initiation of a crash
nuclear development programme by Pakistan, principally for the same
-:bf\ <1:" 0-- f"t
reasons it had not gone nuclear before the test. The United states
f\
resumption of arms shipments to Pakistan in late 1974, enabled the latter to
construct a credible conventional defence force. The lack of subsequent
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nuclear weapons development by India, and Pakistan's renewed close relation-
10
ship with the U.S.A., cemented by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, has
apparently ushered in a degree of greater stability in Indo-Pak
relations.
India and China
At Independence Nehru viewed the Soviet Union as ideologically sound,
the United States as a much needed aid donor and China as a country in
whose civil war India needed to remain non aligned. Nehru welcomed the
victory of Mao's Chinese Communists, hoping that a peaceful united China
would bring peace and prosperity to Asia in general.
The ancient Chinese and Indian Empires had often clashed throughout
their history. India had long feared a unified hostile China. The early
1950's reinforced her fear. One year after securing power, Mao threatened
to occupy Tibet. Threatened by a population two hundred times greater than
its own, Tibet surrendered in the hope of achieving a degree of autonomy
in October 1950. One month later, U.N. forces led by American General
MacAurthur encountered heavy concentrations of Chinese Red Army troops
opposing their march up the Korean peninsula. In an attempt to remain
neutral, Nehru opposed U.N. involvement in Korea and offered to mediate
between U.N. and Chinese leaders. As a perennial enemy, India had reason
to fear an apparently resurgent China that had little regard for the exist-
ing international system. In a further attempt to allay Chinese percep-
tions of India's intentions, Nehru rejected the Truman Doctrine and J.F.
Dulles' plan to contain China by encircling military alliances in the
early 1950's.
During the late 1950's and early 1960's there were regular reports of
border friction on India's northern border with China. The disputed
border areas exemplify the problems of applying Western ideas to regions
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of the world where no obvious border exists. India was willing to refer
the dispute to the International Court of Justice, even though she had
little regard for the organisation (as can be seen by her unilateral
repossessing of Goa from portugal in late 1962) but the P.R.C. showed
no interest in the proposal.
Increasing friction was apparent on the Sino-Indian border in
September 1962. War broke out between the two regional powers on october
20, 1962, with little interest being shown by the rest of the world which
was pre-occupied by the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Indeed, Nehru believed the
distractions of the Cuban Missile Crisis to be a major component in
Chinese strategic decision-making to launch an attack on India.) India
suffered such severe military reverses that an urgent request for fighter
aircraft was sent to Washington in the latter part of the war. The request
was never responded to partly because of a unilateral ceasefire and pull-
back announced by the Chinese on November 21, 1962.
The official Chinese explanation for their unilateral troop with-
drawa1 was that India had caused the war with continual attacks against
Chinese border posts, and had to be "punished"ll for these. The decisive
Chinese "counter-attacks" had adequately punished India, and there was
no need to continue with the war. While this is plausible it must be
considered in conjunction with China's need to assert her autonomy,
especially in light of the failure of the "Great Leap Forward" and the
12
super 'powers' successes in building military alliances to contain
.\.-i
China. The P.R.C. also succeeded in diminishing India's international
stature as leader of the non-aligned movement, a position that China
believed was rightfully hers.
Although she had suffered a major military defeat in 1962, India felt
once again able to cope with a conventional attack from either China or
Pakistan by early 1964. However, the situation was complicated in
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October 1964 by China's detonation of a nuclear device. The official
Indian view of this event was that China remained only a conventional
threat, if any, to India. This view was stated by Prime Minister
Shastri in late 1965, foreseeing world war if a nuclear attack was launched
by China on India. 13 The rejection of a Chinese demand for India to
dismantle its army on the Sikkim border during the 1965 Indo-Pak war
reemphasised India's perception of a nuclear China remaining only a
conventional potential adversary. India's perception of China as a
conventional threat has remained because of the latter's initial inability
to develop a sophisticated delivery system. This view was further com-
pounded by the internal chaos caused by Mao's cultural revolution in
China during the late 1960's and early 1970's. The P.R.C.'s membership
of the U.N. in the early 1970's and her apparent willingness to participate
in the existing international political system reconfirmed the belief that
China only posed a conventional threat "to India's national security.
In the period from Independence until 1974 India fought many wars with
her neighbours, but her existence was never seriously threatened. During
the two crucial years leading up to India's nuclear test, neither Pakistan
nor China posed a serious conventional or nuclear threat to the Indian state.
Pakistan had suffered a demoralising defeat in the 1971 Indo-Pak war.
Although President Bhutto made serious efforts in the wake of the war to
form regional understandings with China (1972), Bangladesh (1973-74) and
other regional powers, it was the belated resumption of conventional arms
shipments in late 1974 that renewed Pakistan's sense of security. The
spread of the Sino-Soviet dispute to South East Asia in the early 1970's
drew Chinese attention away from South Asia. The chaos within China caused
by Mao's Cultural Revolution further reduced the likelihood of an attack
by Communist China on India. During the period after India's nuclear test,
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the P.R.C. became preoccupied by the Sino-U.S. rapprochement. This develop-
ment along with the increasing internal chaos in India, led Peking not to
see India as a potential conventional or nuclear threat.
The present state of affairs suggests a degree ,of regional stability
with China, India and Pakistan accepting the status quo. However, it is
possible that the situation could alter rapidly, especially if either
Pakistan or India deployed nuclear weapons. This~might cause either
India or China to undertake an operation similar to the Israeli attack on
the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Tuwaitha, near Baghdad, in 1982.
India and South Asia in the International System
4' World Regretful but not Surprised'was the headline in The Times
reporting political reaction to India's nuclear explosion two days
· 1 14prevlous y. Peking made no comment on the test; the Japanese government
and four opposition political parties strongly condemned the test. In
Moscow, Pravda noted India had carried out a nuclear test and that it was
peaceful. Washington an'd London "regretted" the test. On May 22, 1974,
Canada stopped all nuclear deliveries to India.
The history of India's position within the world polity of nations
began in August 1947 when, under pressure from the Soviet Union, the United
States and other United Nations member states, Britain withdrew from the
Indian subcontinent. As the Cold War progressed during the late 1940's
it was inevitable that the supe~' powers would move to fill the power vacuum
\.J
left by the rapid British withdrawal. Pakistan immediately looked to
Washington for support, while India, guided by Nehru and Gandhi, deter-
mined not to become embroiled in the traditional power politics game of
international relations.
South Asia's lack of unique strategic or economic resource potential
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for either super power led to the Cold War being played out in other parts
~
of the globe. India's rejection of the United States containment policy
of the P.R.C. reinforced India's need to look elsewhere for allies. The
necessity of preserving the United States as a major source of aid pre-
eluded a close alliance with the Soviet Union and was compounded by Nehru's
wi5h to pursue a positive neutral stance in international affairs. It
was for these reasons in the 1950's that Nehru undertook lengthy visits to
Tito in Yugoslavia and Nasser in Egypt which culminated in the Bandung
f 1 5 d· b h f I 1 f I" 15Conference 0 95 an the irt of aorelgn po icy 0 non a 19nment.
Nehru remained prepared to receive much needed aid from either super-power,
as long as there were no conditions attached, and until India could stand
on her own.
The United States, because of India's reluctance to join a military
alliance in the containment of China, became a major arms supplier to
Pakistan until 1965. India willingly diversified her arms supplies and
never, except ideologically, moved into the Soviet sphere of influence.
The 1962 Sino-Indian war received little attention from the super powers
'-'
because of the on going Cuban Missile Crisis.
The 1965 Indo-Pak war reflected a turning point in super power
attitudes towards South Asia, and one another. The United States suspended
all arms shipments to the region, which adversely affected Pakistan the
most, and tacitly supported, by not undennining., the Soviet sponsored
Tashkent Agreement signed between India and Pakistan in early 1966.
Detente had spread to South Asia and supe~ower cooperation in the
area appeared imminent. Super power involvement in the area during the
V
1950's was characterised by Ameltcan support for Pakistan, the Sino-Soviet
alliance and an India determined to remain non-aligned. The collapse of
I 16the Sino-Soviet alllance led to a tacit super power understanding not
'-'
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to destabilise the South Asian regional system. This was largely the
result of their mutual suspicion of China, particularly following the first
Chinese nuclear test in 1964. Both super powers tried to build alliances
to contain China; firstly, the u.S. with CENTO and SEATO during the 1950's
and early 1960's, and later the Soviet Union in~4South East Asia. Both
Ogtensibly' failed.
The American response to the Soviet attempts to contain China,
especially after the undignified U.S. withdrawal from South East Asia was
to begin the construction of a major naval base at Diego Garcia, 1,000
miles to the south of India. The Americans also began to rearm Pakistan
and commit themselves to Sino-U.S. rapproch~ment, once again in an effort
to contain the Soviet union. 17
The reluctance of India to condemn the Soviet occupation of Afghan-
istan in 1979 alarmed China, Pakistan and the United States, further height-
· 1 .. f·· h· 18ening thelr mutua SUsplclons 0 Soviet intentlons ln Sout ASla.
The supe~ower d~tente and cooperation in South Asia that appeared
imminent in 1966 has yet to materialise in any major or lasting form.
Instead super power actions in the region have continued to reflect (and
V
promote) their global conflict.
Modern India
Modern India, unlike China, has spent only brief periods of her history
19
united, and then only under external conquerors. The Buddhist influence
reached a peak in 200 B.C., especially under Ashoka. Moslem dominance
lasted for approximately 600 years beginning in 1,000 A.D. and was at a
high point under Akbar. The third period of unity occurred during the
introduction of Christianity by the British in the 18th and 19th centuries.
J.K. Galbraith's statement that India, a state with fourteen official
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languages and three principal religions, was a "functioning anarchy" becomes
more understandable when the modern political system in India is examined.
There was relatively little animosity between Colonised and Coloniser
when Britain withdrew from the Indian sub-continent in 1947. Nehru and
other leading members of the Indian National Congress Party were prepared
to adopt western democratic methods and institutions in the governing of
an Independent India because they had used and respected them in their
fight for Independence. Thus began what Nehru called India's adventure
in democracy.
The Republic of India (Bharat) came into being on August 15, 1947,
after a long campaign for Independence from Britain. The Indian Constitu-
tion came into force on January 26, 1950, and provides for ardemocratic
republic, secular, parliamentary and federal in character. It is the most
populous democracy in the world: the 1981 census recorded 684 million
people.
The Indian Constitution is primarily based on that of Britain. While
the President is Head of state and Supreme Military Commander, his real
powers are similar to those of the British Monarch. Real power in Indian
politics lies with the Prime Minister who is appointed by the President
if he can command majority support in the Lok Sabha.
Appointments to and removals from the Council of Ministers or Cabinet
are made by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. The
collective decision-making process characterising the British and Canadian
systems of cabinet government are less apparent in India. Prime Ministers
are not in reality "primus inter pares," but with the aid of formal and
informal advisors they predominate in Cabinet. Cabinet members are mainly
occupied with implementing policy affecting their particular ministries
and day to day administration. Hence, there operates a presidential
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government~similar to that found in the French Fifth Republic.
The Indian Parliament is bi-cameral. The Lok Sabha or House of the
People is more important with 542 directly elected members from single
constituencies. The Rajya Sabha or Council of states with 250 members
predominantly elected by the 31 state legislatures is the Upper House of
Parliament. The two houses have equal power under the constitution
over ordinary legislation, but only the Ldk Sabha may introduce money bills
and the uppa~ house has only the power of delay
20Jawahar~al Nehru, as leader of the Congress Party, was elected
India's first Prime Minister. The assassination of Mohandas K. Gandhi in
1948, the Mahatma or "great soul" inspirational leader of the National
Congress since 1920, allowed Nehru to become known as the "father of Modern
India." Nehru, a tireless worker concerned with building a united,
industrialised, democratic and secure modern state, shaped much of India's
domestic and foreign policy until his death in 1964.
Nehru's influence on Indian society was so great that near the end
of his life people were asking not "who" but "what after Nehru?" A bitter
leadership contest occurred within the Congress Party following Nehru's
death. Eventually Lal Badhur Shastri emerged as the new party leader and
Prime Minister. Shastri had to fill the vacuum left by Nehru, a task that
was made more difficult by the internalAand external events that affected
India during his short tenure in office.
The death of Prime Minister Shastri in January 1966 was followed by
eleven years of Mrs. Gandhi's first tenure as Prime Minister. Mrs. Gahdhi,
the only child of Nehru, was relatively inexperienced politically on
assuming office. In fact/initially her ability to govern was questioned.
She had become leader of the Congress Party and Prime Minister on winning
another divisive leadership contest within the Congress Party. Mrs.
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Gandhi won because she was the only acceptable alternative to Moraji
Desai within Congress and would be able to unite the masses behind the
party. As her experience increased, Mrs. Gandhi's popularity surpassed
that of her father among the Indian people and by the early 1970's
was referred to as Mother India. However, as the political and economic
situation deteriorated in the mid 1970's, so Mrs. Gandhi's popularity waned.
Economic crisis, political and social unrest, and electoral irregularities
"forced" Mrs. Gandhi to declare a period of Emergency Rule in June 1975. 21
Mrs. Gandhi, much as President Nixon did in refusing to release the
Watergate tapes, claimed to be acting in the interests of her office and
the state.
Nehru's "adventure in democracy" appeared to be ending with a decree
by his daughter. Mrs. Gandhi defended her actions by saying "It is
sometimes forgotten that the very meaning of words like democracy ... keeps
changing .... As the world changes all concepts and definitions change.,,22
The Foreign and Defence Policy Process
On achieving Independence India was almost immediately confronted by
the Kashmir war of 1948 with Pakistan. The problem of formulating and
implementing foreign and defence policies through respective ministries
became an urgent task confronting the fledgling .,'0.' state. Which people
and what ministries had what powers had yet to be clearly defined.
The President is constitutionally the Head of State, but has very
little influence in the policy formulati:on and implementation processes,
especially in Indian foreign policy. Only in times of emergency, for
example during the Sino-Indian war of 1962, the 1971 Indo-Pak war, and
Mrs. Gandhi's declaration of a State of Emergency in 1975 does the Presi-
dent, acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers, have any formal
power in the Indian policy process.
52
The Council of Ministers or Cabinet is where the real power lies in the
Indian foreign policy process. Right up until his death Nehru was External
Affairs Minister as well as Prime Minister and Minister responsible for
Atomic Energy. "Jawaharal Nehru was able to impress his personal stamp
on the foreign policy of India,,,23 as have subsequent Prime Ministers.
India's active role in international affairs, seeking international aid,
countering external military threats and promoting a foreign policy of
non alignment has allowed India's prime ministers to playa prominent, if
not the main role in the foreign policy process.
The External Affairs Minister is usually a senior member of the
Cabinet, presiding over a ministry of some 7,000 employees with 112
24
overseas missions. Junio~f' 'Ministers chosen from Parliament ensure
political control of the Ministry, while the Foreign Secretary and three
senior secretaries are responsible for administration of the ministries'
divisions (nine Functional,eg.legal treaties, economic, etc., nine
Territorial, eg. Africa, America, etc., and one Administrative Division).
Constitutionally, Parliament is not involved in the foreign policy
process. Debates, questions, government statements and control of the
budget by Parliament allow. considerable influence on the process.
However, there is no parliamentary standing committee to review foreign
policy. Outside of Parliament, foreign affairs are vigorously debated
in the media and by large sections of the There is little interest
group activity in the process but there is growing academic input.
The influence of the Congress Party in the foreign policy process is
considerable, partly due to its long tenur~ as the ruling party, and partly
because of it~ m~ss support throughout the country. ~. Park goes so far
as to suggestr "The considered opinion of the Congress Party today is
likely to be official policy tomorrow.,,25
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Thus we can see that the senior members of government and the Congress
Party, usually one and the same, have had a major effect on Indian foreign
policy formulations and implementations. While debate over foreign
policy is widespread, the electorate and Parliament have only informal
influence in the policy process.
Similar conclusions can be drawn about the defence policy process.
The president, acting on the advice of his council of ministers and the two
Houses of Parliament, has ultimate responsibility for national defence.
Again, it is the Cabinet that exercises real power in matters of defence;
Parliament rarely uses its constitutionally given influence. The Cabinet
cannot raise or spend money for defence purposes without the authority of
Parliament. Yet, there is no parliamentary standing committee on defence,
but the Estimates Committee, the Public Accounts Committee, the Committee
on Public Undertakings, and the Comptroller and Auditor General can
examine some aspects of defence spending. In practise this is not the
case.R~Thomas notes that
Even during the East Bengal crisis year of 1971, the presentation of
the defence budget produced little substantive debate on the specifics
of defence spending, and continued to display most members' general
lack of2gnowledge on the strategic situation confronting the
nation.
If M.P.'s were ever to question defence appropriations, "the government
could push through Parliament any amount demanded by the Defence Ministry
while at the same time being able to avoid justifying it on grounds of
. 27
securlty." One M.P. suggested that the defence bill might as well be.
"directly certified" by the President to avoid the "farce of the motions
of getting us blindly to endorse a huge bill of expenditure.,,28 The
willingness of Parliament to accept any Cabinet defence expenditure plans
without question was exemplified in the two budgetary years following the
Sino-Indian war of 1962. Greater amounts were appropriated' than could be
b b d b th d · 29a sor eye arme serVlces. outside of Parliament the Congress
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Party is the major input into the defence policy process.
Thomas succinctly summarises the foreign and defence policy process
in India by claiming that what occurs is "essentially individual ministerial
accountability to the ruling party, much less cabinet responsibility to
parliament as a whole, and little parliamentary control over defence.,,30
The structure favours centralised decision-making, the significance of
which will be seen in Chapter III.
The A9-vent .. of Nuclear Energy
The Atomic Age began on July 16, 1945, when the Manhattan Project
completed its assignment to explode an atomic device. Robert Oppenheimer,
the Manha~tan project leader, on viewing the test from his observation
post said, "I am become death." Within weeks the military potential of
atomic devices became more apparent with the U.S.A.F. dropping bombs on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Government interest in the atom began with Einstein's splitting of the
atom--the resulting energy producing potential caused many states to
initiate research projects. The potential military applications ensured
large scale funding for research, but as in the development of many other
peaceful tools of mankind, it was the existence of war that brought forth
the final development of atomic energy.
In a letter to President Roosevelt in 1939 Albert Einstein pointed out
the military potential of an atomic' explosion, and urged attention be
given to its development as the ~mans were making great advances in
atomic science. 3l The top secret Manhattan P~oject was initiated involving
some of the top scientists from occupied Europe, then settled in the U.S.A.,
Britain and Canada.
The Manhattan Project was disbanded after VJ Day and international
cooperation and sharing of atomic knowledge was curtailed. This became
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official u.s. policy in 1946 with the MacMahon Act of Congress essentially
halting the sharing of atomic secrets with America's allies. The
American's desire to maintain their atomic weapons monopoly encouraged
other nations to develop their own super weapons, while simultaneously
developing civilian atomic generating facilities.
The Soviet Union had never been invited to join the Manhattan
Project and thus was relatively unprepared for the atomic age. The
increasingly wide ideological conflict between the Soviet Union and the
United States was partly fueled in the late 1940's by the former's
mistrust of America's intentions to maintain an atomic weapons monopoly.
The Soviet Union undertook a crash progranune and with the help of secrets
passed by the spy ring of Philby, Burgess and Maclean, and Fuchs exploded
an atomic device in August 1948 breaking the U.s. monopoly. The nuclear
arms race had begun.
Three years later,a1rnost.to the day, Great Britain exploded an atomic
device in a small group of islands off the North West Coast of Australia.
Britain's development of an atomic device had been aided by an exclusive
special relationship with the United states in atomic physics. Continued
membership in the Big Three Club by Britain required that she develop and
deplqy nuclear weapons in order to remain an equal to the U.S. and Soviet
Union. Essentially, the 1952 display of independence and great power
status was merely to enhance British prestige on the international stage
and served to make the 1956 Suez debacle and her subsequent loss of
international standing even more precipitous. The American failure to lend
support to the Anglo-French Suez expedition, and indeed economic pressures
to induce withdrawal, compounded by Khruschev's threat to drop atomic
devices on 'their capitals if Britain and France did not withdraw, reaffirmed
French desires to break the Anglo-American monopoly of nuclear w'eapons in
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the West. On February 13, 1960, in the Sahara Desert, the French ex-
ploded a nuclear device and became the fourth member of an exclusive club.
A similar withdrawal, as that of the u.S. over Suez by the Soviet
Union of a "nuclear umbrella'," and dissatisfaction with allies in the
sharing of atomic secrets, encouraged the Peoples Republic of China to
develop a nuclear weapons capability. In the late 1950's the increasingly
acrimonious Sino-Soviet dispute and Khruschev's "peace offering" to
Eisenhower in the hope of inducing U.S. support for a test ban treaty and
a nuclear proliferation treaty, resulted in atomic science cooperation
between the two communist giants being unilaterally ended by the Soviet
Union. The Chinese were incensed. In an effort to gain prestige in the
Third World and asa method of underlining that the superpowers and their
allies were not invincible, especially as Mao thought atomic bombs were
merely "paper tigers,,,33 China exploded a nuclear device in the Taklamakan
Desert in Sianking Province on October 10, 1964.
Thus, as Richard Betts has pointed out, the first two nuclear weapons
states competed politically on a global basis. 34 The third and fourth
members of the nuclear club, Britain and France, had illusions of world-
wide influence. Today, their nuclear arsenals are, as is the Chinese
arsenal, accepted as of only regional importance.
Britain's possession of nuclear weapons has not significantly
altered the regional balance of power in Europe. The French and Chinese
acquisition of nuclear weapons in their regional operating environments,
Betts argues, has tended to "support the argument that nuclear multi-
polarity increases stability by reducing a nuclear power's ability to
coerce its rivals.,,35 While Betts is not suggesting that every state
should possess nuclear weapons in the interests of world peace,
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It is interesting that nothing in the record of proliferation to date
proves the assumption that the process makes the world more dangero~5
by increasing the risk of war through escalation of conflicts.
It could, therefore, be argued that if37 India developed a nuclear
weapons capability, without putting a serious strain on its internal societal
structure, a greater degree of strategic stability might result in South
. 38ASla.
Peaceful ~Uses of Nuclear Explosions
The discovery of atomic power promoted further research into its
use as a means of solving mankind's quest for a cheap, clean and renewa~le
source of energy. Such hopes are a far cry from 1985, a time of nuclear
arms races, threatened melt-downs at nuclear reactors and nuclear waste
spills.
The Manhattan Project had an important civilian spinoff in the
generation of electricity. The United States was quick to develop a capa-
bility for generating electricity using atomic reactors. The Soviet Union
and Western Europe soon imitated the Americans, hoping to fuel their
industrial rebuilding in the aftermath of World War II. It soon became
apparent that atomic power would not be a rejuvenating tool in the developed
world alone. In 19 , India's first research reactor became critical,
emphasising the Third World's interest in atomic power. Since the mid
1950's there has been a rapid vertical and horizontal spread of atomic
generating units throughout the world.
The high capital cost of building an atomic generating plant could
be offset by the assurance of a cheap abundant supply of electricity.
Further, because of rapid industrialisation in many parts of the world--
following World War II, a dependable, quickly-constructed energy source
was needed. In 1953 President Eisenhower announced the Atoms for Peace
project whereby America would transfer atomic knowledge to peaceful friend-
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ly countries if they agreed not to use their knowledge to develop nuclear
weapons. Many countries accepted the limitations and accepted the
Americans' offer. India, amongst others, rejected the Atoms for Peace
plan as it did not require the United States to dispose of her nuclear
weapons. The plan obviously enshrined America's "right" to nuclear weapons
while denying others the same right. It has also been argued that the
plan was commercially based so the United States could maintain her
technological lead over her Western European competitors by selling atomic
39generating plants. Global economic development since 1945 was/therefore,
made possible partly by atomic energy proliferation. The oil crisis of
1973-74 spurred greater reliance upon atomic power than in the past as its
relative cost had declined. Consequently orders for atomic plants drama-
tically increased in the late 1970's, especially from the Third World.
40However, now the reactor market is virtually dead. Construction
costs have greatly increased and nuclear power is no longer regarded as
a particularly cheap energy source. The Three Mile Island incident in
the U.S.A. confirmed many of the worst expectations of the ease with which
melt-downs might occur. In the U.s. many atomic power stations have
been halted in their construction or closed down not long after becoming
active because of serious budget overruns and/or their safety was in
question. 4l Reactors, however, have other uses that are also important
42in economic development.
Without becoming too technical it is useful briefly and simply to
explain the manufacture of an atomic device. The raw material required for
the generation of electricity by an atomic plant is Uranium--it comes in
essentially two types: UR-235 and UR-239. The production of uranium is
limited because it is found only in a few countries (Canada, South Anrica,
Soviet Union, Namibia and Zaire are the largest producers). Uranium-239
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forms the basis of a nuclear device, but plutonium can be used as an alter-
native. Plutonium is not a natural mineral--it is the waste product of
uranium after it has passed through an atomic reactor. The production of
Uranium-239 nuclear devices is limited by the need to obtain the raw
material and process it, not an easy operation; plutonium as the waste
product of an atomic reactor is available to all those who, generate elec-
tricity by atomic methods. However, the sale, transfer and disposal of
uranium is strictly controlled by the International A~mic Energy Agency
(IAEA), but not all countries adhere to its safeguards. Further, there
are bilateral safeguards often in line with and sometimes more stringent
than those which the IAEA, recommends. Even so, it is impossible to ensure
that some uranium or plutonium is not diverted by a country intent upon
· I d· 43constructlng a nuc ear eVlce.
Once the relevant ingredients are at hand, it is relatively easy to
construct a nuclear device. A Harvard University student in 1974 was able
to outline the main procedures, purely by consulting various available
government public documents. A state intent upon building a nuclear device
with qualified scientists and the relevant raw materials could be capable
of detonating a device through a crash programme within a matter of years.
Since 1974 there has been increased debate as to whether the detona-
tioD of a nuclear device implies an intention to manufacture nuclear
weapons, as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) assumes. 44 While the
technology required to build and detonate a military and a non-military
device are essentially the same, there has been a distinction made between
peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE's) and nuclear devices developed for
military purposes. Further, it must be remembered that the Soviet Union,
Britain, France and China preceded India's 1974 test with an explosion for
peaceful uses, that is, a deterrent to ensure peace. The United States
claimed that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were necessary to bring
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peace that much sooner to the Far East in 1945.
There have been a large number of nuclear explosions since 1945,
mainly associated with the development and testing of nuclear weapons.
However, there have also been a significant number of nuclear explosions
used as a substitute for conventional explosives. In spite of the pos-
sibility of subsequent contamination of the environment with radioactive
fall-out, the bigger explosion at a lower cost than conventional explosives
I d 1 "45has resu te in over 00 such proJects.
1 " d "46 I" d h th S "tYu A.. Izrae ..L an M. P. Grechuskl.na co.ut l.ne two areas were e OVl.e
Union has been using nuclear explosives engineering. Firstly, the use
of cratering explosions in construction industry, particularly channel,
cana147 and reservoir construction and the opening up of mineral deposits. 48
Secondly, in the use of contained nuclear explosions in industry to stimulate
oil and gas production and the working of natural ore deposits, and for
the construction of cavities for the storage of gas and oil products, or
the burial of waste. There has also been some mention of the Soviets using
nuclear explosions in mineral extraction from beneath the seabed.
Although the USA, has undertaken some construction work using nuclear
explosives, this has attracted little support or money in recent years
and has apparently been discontinued. The Soviet Union, seemingly still
s~es a potential for nuclear explosions in civilian projects. While there
has been much discussion of using nuclear explosives engineering in many
Third World countries, no such projects have occurred. In populous countries
the cheapness and abundance of under-utilised labour would tend to reduce
the advantages of NEE, construction projects. (The development of an
indigenous NEE, project by a Third World country would be avoided under
Article V of the Nuc1ear"Proliferation Treaty (1970) which encourages the
peaceful transfer of nuclear explosives for such projects but has yet
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to be used).
Mil~tary Uses of a Nuclear Device
The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki essentially ended the Second
World War, and ushered in a new era of arms development. While there has
been no subsequent World War, inter-nation violence has continued unabated.
Yet, though many nations possess, or have the ability to develop them in
a short space of time, nuclear weapons have not been used except as a threat
since 1945.
For the purpose of this section it will be assumed that any state
. exploding a nuclear device has a military intention. It is enlightening
to ask why any state should wish to undertake a major commitment to
develop a nuclear weapons system that will likely (hopefully) never
be used, particularly when nuclear weapons are such a headache for the
super powers. If we can answer the why we can better identify who will
likely acquire nuclear weapons in the future.
A state that wishes to develop its own nuclear w~~pons must have the
political will and the technical capability to do so.49 Richard Betts
observes that existing Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) developed their nuclear
weapons because they perceived a potentially threatening adversary.50
It is, therefore, a political decision to develop nuclear weapons. A
decision to commit the financial, technical and personnel resources of a
state to such a project can only be taken by politicians.
While most states perceive an external threat, they may not decide
to meet that threat by acquiring nuclear weapons. This is usually the
case/for many different reasons including a lack of technical ability.
This is especially true in the Third World where a shortage of relevantly
trained personnel, technical support facilities and the accessibility of
raw materials preclude nuclear development although the political will may
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exist. Assuming the existence of the political will and the technical
capability to develop a nuclear bomb, there is still a need to accurately
deliver the device. The cost of developing and deploying "an effective
guidance and delivery system is considerable and cannot be explained away
in a similar manner to that of a peaceful nuclear explosion.
51Why India Exploded a Nuclear Device
This section puts forward three generally accepted theories as to why a
state might decide to detonate a nuclear device: strategic/military,
peaceful, and psychological/prestige. Each will be examined in turn in
the case of India's 1974 nuclear test.
Strategic/MilitarYReasons for Tes~t_
Examining Betts' claim that "No state without apparently threatening
adversaries has yet acqUired nuclear weapons" 52 in relation to India,
requires the identification of potential threats to Indian national security.
On the sub-continent
On the global scale, the Soviet and American response to the Indian test
h . ' fl· 1 · 1 · · .. ' J:. ..53was tat lt was 0 ltt e ml ltary slgnlLlcance.
of India, many writers at the time claimed that it seriously upset the
regional balances of power and would spark a South Asian nuclear arms
race. Such power politics conjecturing took little account of t~le actual
strategic/m.ilitary environment in. South Asia in 1974, and in retrospect,
is faundto have little factual support.
As early as 1967, Cohen argues, \'lashington had confirmed India's
This
"sub-continental preminence and 'great power' status ,"and Pakistan could
,,54
"no longer obtain strategic superiority on the sub-continent
conclusion was even more apparent by 1974 following the dismemberment of
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Pakistan in the aftermath of the 1971 Indo-Pak war. Although India's
conventional Armed Forces were divided between the Chinese and Pakistan
borders, it is safe to assume that India could adequately repel a conventional
armed attack by any of its neighbours, except possibly China.
The likelihood of a conventional military confrontation between
India and the P.R.C. in 1974 was limited. On the domestic level, :China
was in a state of internal chaos due to the failure of the Cultural
Revolution and the rule by the Gang of Four. On the ~orld stage, Peking
was attempting to gain international respectability and restructure its
relations with the United states. A Chinese attack on India would have
put attainment of both these goals in jeopardy. Even if China had con-
sidered undertaking such a power politics action, the possession of nuclear
weapons by India would have been unlikely to deter the P.R.C. India's
inability to attack major Chinese population centres due to its inadequate
potential delivery vehicles (in the gUise of agl ing supersonic aircraft)
i..--/
and, by 1974, China's considerable nuclear capability and advanced delivery
system (including ICBM's), effectively precludes the possibility of Indian
decisionmakers contemplating a nuclear response to a conventional Chinese
invasion. Closing the ten year gap in Chinese and Indian nuclear capability
would have been a considerable undertaking requiring a far more sustained
and costly effort than India undertook in exploding a nuclear device in
1974, and than has been the case to date.
It has been suggested that India exploded a nuclear device in 1974
to maintain her nuclear lead over Pakistan. Then Pakistan Foreign Minister,
Ali Bhutto's suggestion that Pakistanis would eat grass in order to get the
bomb (1965) did not result in major activity towards such acquisition. 55
Hypothetical scenarios of an 'Islamic bomb' with a Pakistani finger on
the trigger56 "fails to recognise Pakistan's limited capabi1ies, the
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mUltipl~ divisions in the Islamic world, and the destructive power of the
d · l' t' ,,57assume antl-Is amlC coun rles. The Islamic bomb developed by Pakistan
in conjunction with other Islamic countries is unlikely ever to occur. 58
The development of a nuclear capability by Pakistan alone fails to
take account of India's "far superior nuclear establishment,,,59 and the
possible termination of economic, military and technological aid by the
west. Rais concludes
the crude nuclear device that Pakistan could produce would place
it far behind India in over all nuclear weapons capability because
Pakistan lacks the parallel technological deve1optgOnts in critical
areas of fission explosion and delivery systems. '
Thus it would seem safe, if not sensible/to conclude that India's
strategic/military position in 1974 did not warrant the development of a
nuclear weapons capability. Subsequent events tend to confirm this
conclusion.
As the sixth nation on Earth to undertake a nuclear explosion, India
has not followed the route of its predessors. It has not tested any more
61devices. It has not diverted or appropriated extra money from the
conventional defence budget. It has not deployed nuclear weapons.
In spite of India's refusal to carry out sUbsequent nuclear tests,
there has been on-going development of rocket and satellite technology.
Elkin and Friedricks62 conclude that in such areas as reconnaissance,
command and control, weather forecasting and intermediate range ballistic
missiles, India's accomplishments have direct military applicability.
However, while noting these conclusions, other writers 63 have highlighted
the many delays and problems in India's rocket and satellite development
projects. Further, the fact that these advances have military applicability
should not obscure their importance to the process of Indian economic
and inductria1 development.
The military benefits that India may have accrued in exploding a
As Prime Minister Gandhi
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nuclear device, then, are difficult to pin point. A common assertion of
~.
India's ability to use nuclear blackmail against Pakistan is debatable.
" I " · ,,64 · th "t f-Tn response to such a power po ltlCS assumptlon, e eX1S ence o. a
considerable Indian conventional military advantage, and the lack of
subsequent development of a nuclear capability have already been mentioned.
Rais points to another factor that further obscures the Pakistani pro-
claimed nuclear blackmail thesis. A confrontational history since indepen-
dence of "action-reaction strategies ... India and Pakistan would out of
psychological and political necessities attempt to acquire rough nuclear
parity,,65 regardless of other restraints. The fact that Pakistan did not
begin a "crash" nuclear weapons programme in 1974, might partly result
from Pakistani decisionmakers seeing no new threat to their security from
the Indian test.
By 1985 Pakistan still had not made any serious or sustained attempts
to attain nuclear weapons. Rajiv Gandhi's warnings of an imminent nuclear
arms race in South Asia66 can once again be better explained as political
rhetoric by an Indian Prime Minister than a serious expectation.
Peaceful Reasons for a Test
The announcement of the Sarabhai Nuclear Energy and Space Programme
in 1971 reflected growing international and domestic optimism in India's
economic development prospects. The fourth five year plan announced in
1969 would enable India "to stand on our own feet as soon as possible and
1 t f f ," d ,,67not take a very arge amoun 0 orelgn al .
noted "we are doing with less aid because of our own desire and because
less aid is available.,,68 The completion of an indigenously built plutonium
processing plant in 1971 emphasises India's growing tec'hnological competence
and economic expectation for the 1970's.
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The official Indian announcement of the May 18, 1974 test emphasised
that it was purely for peaceful purposes. The Indian Government had con-
sistently claimed only peaceful intentions for their nuclear industry,
except during the late 1940' s 69 and under Prime Minister Shast:r-i when
the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons was publicly discussed.
Peaceful intentions in this section will be taken to mean a tool of
internal economic development that may also be used to aid friendly Third
World countries in their economic development. While India faces many
impediments to her economic development, not the least being a complex
geological terrain,70 it is uncertain which problems it was hoped Nuc.lear
Explosives Engineering (NEE) might provide a solution in the early 1970's,
or to date. The use of nuclear explosions to create underground caverns
within India has not been well researched. For construction projects
above ground, Mehta notes "India has always had a large indeterminable
floating population of destitute men and women who, without any assistance
from nuclear devices, would for the mere opportunity of gainful employment,
· ,,71 f 1 1move mountalns. The use 0 nuc ear exp osives engineering seems to have
had little promise for the economic development of India; especially
considering the fact that such technology was, in theory, available to her
from the IAEC as laid out in Article V of the 1970 Nuclear Proliferation
Treaty.
PSYChologica172/prestige Reasons for a Test
f d · d 1· f·· 73The concept 0 omestlc an internationa prestlge 0 a reglme
is difficult to define and often leads to ambiguity. However, for lack of
a better term the following benefits that accrued to the Indian Government
following the 1974 nuclear test will be labelled Psychological/Prestige
reasons for a test. principally, these were:
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1. Showing off India's technological prowess, thus reinforcing her
claimed independence from and growing equality with, industrialised states.
2. Uniting domestic popular opinions behind Mrs. Gandhi's ailing
regime.
While India was widely condemned by western industrialised nations
for a few months after the 1974 test, the fact that India is an under-
developed nation and could explode a nuclear device gave hope to many
countrJes that believed they had been intentionally kept underdeveloped
by the capitalist west.
China's test in 1964 had broken the industrialised nations' (including
the Soviet Union) monopoly of nuclear technology, but this had been subs-
tantia1ly aided by the Soviet Union until 1959. Further, Peking was
still viewed with suspicion by many Third World states, and any bilateral
agreements with the P.R.C. in the 1960's on nuclear sharing may have
j eopardised the recipients' relati10nship with either supevower.
In India, the Chinese nuclear test sparked off widescale public debate
about nuclear weapons proliferation in South Asia. Until this time the
majority of Indians had never considered the subject; when their perennial,
h d 1 " .,,
7 4 h d ·nort ern enemy scorne nuc ear weapons as paper tlgers, t e In lan
people remembering their military defeat of 1962, began to demand that India
also develop a nuclear weapons capability.
The growing economy of the early 1970's based largely on good monsoons
in the late 1960's, the military defeat of Pakistan in 1971, and the decisive
leadership of Nehru's daughter, b~ought a sense of "one nation" to India
as exemplified by the sweeping parliamentary election victories of Congress
" in March 1971. The announcement of the May 18, 1974, nuclear test re-
vived the "one nation" feeling of unity with virtually all the political
parties represented in the Lok Sabha applauding the accomplishment.
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However, as a distraction from the worsening economic political and social
problems that had emerged since 1972, its effect was short-lived.
India's nuclear programme had largely been an indigenous effort by
what appeared in the early 1970's to be an emerging industrial power
committed to peace and equality among all nations. The number of visiting
foreign dignitaries particularly from Third World states considerably
75increased in the months after the 1974 test India signed many bilateral
agreements during the period on the sharing of nuclear technology, notably
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with Argentina and Iran.
As will become more apparent in Chapter III, the Psychological/
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Prestige benefits that accrued to the Indian Government in undertaking a
nuclear test shows scant regard for the inevitable negative repercussions.
The benefits of increased Third World respect, and the almost unanimous
domestic applause for the May test tended to negate the west's unfavour-
able response.
The purpose of this section has been to suggest that India did not
receive any military or economic benefits from exploding a nuclear device
in May 1974. It undoubtedly did in both of these areas but they were only
of small importance in relation to the international and domestic prestige
that the Indian Government subsequently acquired.
The capability to deploy nuclear weapons is not sufficient to imply
that the political will exists to use them. E.W. Lefev~"" points out "The
weapons themselves are inert and neutral until they are given meaning by
human volition within a political setting ,,78 It is a political decision
to acquire nuclear status, and "Even in the case of the super powers the
political leadership still maintains the right to give instructions on
the use of all strategic and theatre nuclear weapons." The acquisition of
nuclear status is "rooted in unique circumstances and has led to diverse
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consequences." In the next chapter the "unique circumstances" that
led India to acquire nuclear status will be more closely examined in light
of the theories of decision-making described in Chapter I.
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Chapter III: Muddling Along, Not Yet Through
The literature review of decision-making theory and foreign policy for-
mulation, and the second chapter concerning India in the international
system, and nuclear technology are a necessary prelude to explaining
Indian nuclear decision-making. While this is obviously a continuous
process, it is necessary to split the explanation into three periods:
1944-72; 1972-74 and 1974 onwards.
The reason for these apparently arbitrary divisions can best be
explained in conjunction with the title of this chapter. (Muddling along,
not yet througW is a paraphrase of Charles Lindblom's famous description
f " tId I I • 1o lncremen a eC1Slon-maklng. By incremental Lindblom means change
by small steps over a period of time--in our case a period of thirty
years. A refinement of this process is disjointed incrementalism
whereby the small steps of change occur but are not linked. utilising
Lindblom's concept of disjointed incrementalism, it will be seen from a
macro-perspective, how "one thing led to another" in India's nuclear
decision-making from 1944 to the present. However, if we analyse each
change of policy on a micro level, using the three main theories of decision-
making processes as we do with the critical period from 1972 leading
up to the nuclear test in 1974, we will better understand what Professor
2Kapur labelf\a "zig-zag pattern" to May 1974.
It will be argued later in this chapter that the test was merely one
step, albeit a major one, in India's nuclear policy. The technological
drift up to the mid 1960's, and the political indecision until 1972;
uncertain goals ofa nuclear test followed by an apparent lack of interest
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in further development suggests a pattern of muddling through in the early
and middle years of India's nuclear policy. As Lindblom was later to
point out, muddling through suggests an end is in sight; he later altered
the inference of his writing to "muddling along, not yet through" in
order to emphasise that the process is usually never ending. 3 Thus, in
India's nuclear policy "muddling will continue" into the future.
In its entirety, India's nuclear development illustrates the problems
of applying any decisional model to a long chain of events in which people,
personalities, perceptions and goals alter in relation to the dynamic
operating environment. It can be argued that the early and middle
years of India's nuclear development did not necessarily preordain a
nuclear test explosion. The dynamics of the decision to go ahead with
a nuclear test are the focus of this chapter.
In applying the various theories of decision to the process by which
the Indian Government decided to explode a nuclear device during the
4period 1972 to 1974, four "cuts" or explanations are offered. The first
cut gives an analytic (or rational) explanation. The second cut or cy-
bernetic explanation incorporates Models II and III. The third cut,
the cognitive explanation is separated from the two cybernetic models in
order to emphasise the importance of an individual's belief systems
on the process of decision. The fourth cut applies Stein and Tanter's
constrained rationality model to the events leading up to the 1974 test.
Thus, the micro-perspective shows that by applying the three de-
cisiona1 theories we can better understand Indian nuclear decision-making
during a certain time period. The brief section on constrained rationality,
in combining the three models, however, emphasises each theory's
we.aknesses in that each theory is only useful in different instances at
different times.
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Muddling Along: The Macro-PersEective
The first small step on the road to the May 1974 test can be traced to
mid-year in 1944, when the Tata Institute for Fundamental Research was
established as part of the Bombay Plan for India's post-war reconstruc-
tion. The Tata Institute was primarily to investigate the. further supply
of energy to meet India's expected post-war requirements.
The atomic bombs dropped by the United States on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki concluded the Second World War, and left political leaders in the
Far East stunned. Nehru, in June 1946, did not immediately rule out
India developing and using atomic weapons if she were attacked. 5
The United States Congress passed the MacMahon Act in 1946 preventing
further bilateral contact on atomic technology similar to that which had
occurred under the Manhattan Project. Spurred by this, and by the hope
that peaceful uses of atomic energy might emerge and enable India and
developing countries in general to industrialise rapidly, the Indian Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEC) was established. It was to be an outgrowth of the
Tata Institute for Fundamental Research created by an Act of Parliament
in 1948. The Act gave the IAEC, presided over by a Minister of
Cabinet traditionally the Prime Minister, control over the working and
export of all fissionable substances.
Indian external relations have been characterised by a reluctance of
being too closely allied with either protagonist in the Cold War. This
was reflected in India's nuclear policy in the 1950's. Indigenous
research, aided by Canada through the Colombo Plan, enabled Nehru to
reject Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace project,6 denouncing it as a way of
maintaining a superpower nuclear weapons and technology monopoly, ensuring
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the continued divide between rich and poor states. In August 1956, India's
and Asia's first experimental atomic reactor became critical. The fact
that the reactor was inftigenously built only added to the extent of the
achievement. India's impressive achievements in atomic sciences soon
brought the possibility of exploding a nuclear device into Indian political
debate. In ~uly, 1957, Nehru foresaw only peaceful uses for nuclear
explosions, doubting any future Indian Government would see any use for
7
a nuclear test.
Political debate during the 1950's in newly-independent India centred
more on relieving poverty than on the development of nuclear technology
(although senior politicians claimed it was hard to separate the two).8
The IAEC operated largely in secret with little political interference.
Such a free hand led to it being labelled "a state within a state.,,9
It was able to operate very much as it desired with little political
intereference; except for controlling its "purse strings_," but this was
never a real hindrance.
In 1964, Dr. Homi Bhabha, Vice Chairman of the IAEC, known as the
father of India's bomb, broadcast on All India Radio in favour of India
d ·· 1 10 ·pro uClng ltS own nuc ear weapons. This can be seen as a slgnificant,
but not crucial, turning point that led to Prime Minister Shastri's
announcement of the Subterranean Nuclear Explosion Project (SNEP) allowing
for the development of a nuclear device to continue until three months
before a test was possible.
Dr. Bhabha's radio broadcast can be regarded as a small step in
India's nuclear policy since 1944. India was near the forefront of nuclear
technology and was thus internationally respected. Il It would be unnatural
for a scientist who had worked so conscientiously towards such a momentous
event not to desire to see the next step taken, thus proving his work
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valuable. Dr. Bhabha, therefore, supported a nuclear test, the natural
culmination of his work. Bhabha's broadcast came soon after China
exploded her first nuclear device in the Taklamakan Desert, Sianking
Province. Dr. Bhabha warned "no form of power is as expensive as no power,,,12
an obvious reference to India's nuclear neighbour. The SNEP was given the
go"-'ahead'in December 1965, by Prime Minister Shastri. Shastri replaced
Nehru as Prime Minister and Minister for Atomic Affairs after Nehru's
death in May 1964. Replacing the father of modern India was likely to be
no easy task--especially as Shastri had not come to power with unanimous
Congress Party support. The disastrous war with Pakistan in 1965 led to
widespread public support for India to develop a nuclear weapons programme.
In September 1965, 86 Members of Parliament from the Lok Sabha signed
a petition supporting such a move. Thus, reflecting the majority of public
opinion, Shastri gave the green light to the SNEP. We can see l'1ow the
domestic and international environment influenced a reluctant prime minister
to make this apparently major political decision.
Within two months of the SNEP being adopted, Shastri and Bhabha
were dead. The main scientific protagonist and the premier political
decisionmaker of the SNEP had died. Mrs. Gandhi, the only daug.hter of
Jawahar"lal Nehru, was chosen as the only person who could effectively
unite the Congress party in the country and within the party against Morajai
Desai, the other main contender for Congress leader. Mrs. Gandhi was
sceptical about the development of nuclear weapons from the beginning of
her term as Prime Minister and thus cancelled the SNEP soon after coming
. 13to offlce. While this initially appears as a major reversal of policy,
it too can be seen as an incremental step in light of the dynamic environ-
ment in which it occurred.
Shastri had died following the negotiation of an "honourable" agree-
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ment at Tashkent with Pakistan. Bhabha had died in a plane crash on his
way to replace a reluctant Canada (because of the SNEP) with France as
India's main supplier of nuclear raw materials and technology.' Mrs.
Gandhi, as Shastri's successor, was not widely experienced in Indian
government and feared for India's security following the 1962 and 1965
border wars. Due to poor economic· performance, India was also reliant
upon western aid. The Indian scientificcommul1ity was weakened by the
loss of Bhabha, and Mrs. Gandhi's name ensured her wide pUblic support
for whatever she did. Thus, the weak domestic political position of Prime
Minister Gandhi and India's weak international position made the cancellation
of theSNEP only a small step along the road to the 1974 test.
During the mid 1960's· formal international discussion of a N.uclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) got under way in Geneva.. Ambassador
Trivedi representing India remained throughout a critic of the negotia-
tions proclaiming them as a means of enshrining the United States), the
Soviet Union, Britain, France and China's monopoly on nuc;lear weapons. 14
Renunciation of future nuclear weapons by non-nuclear weapons states
(NNWS) was only acceptable to India if attempts at horizontal nuclear
disarmament were successful. Ambassador Trivedi's arguements in Geneva
were very much in line with India I s general foieJgn policy, stance since
Independence: non-alighment or positive neutralism in seeking to reduce
Cold War tension and nuclear armament levels.
Partly due to ,the failure of gaining a commitment to disarmament by
the nuclear weapon states (NWS), India did not sign the NPT. India
intended to keep her options open vis avis the further development of
nuclear technology which was not to be impeded by an "unfair" NPT. The
death of Dr. Bhabhaand the threat-of losing contact with important
Canadian counterparts ~ed the IAEC to accept bilateral safeguards on the
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raw materials and plant received from Canada. While Mrs. Gandhi and
15
the IAEC were prepared to accede to the NPT, the fact that India did
not sign the NPT can be viewed as another incremental step in Indian nuclear
decision-making.
In 1971, India completed a plutonium separation plant which was not
subject to bilateral or multilateral safeguards. The separation plant was
a result of the continued work of the IAEC in developing an indigenously
based nuclear industry. The unsafeguarded processed uranium (plutonium)
could either be used in plutonium using power stations or in a nuclear
explosion.
1972-1974: The Micro-Perspective
Within a few months of India's decisive military intervention 'in the
Pakistan civil war, a decision was taken to go ahead with a test explosion
of a nuclear device. 16 Nearly thirty years of "zig-zag" in India's n~clear
policy appeared to be at an end. Although the decision was reversible
right up until the moment of detonation, the test went ahead and India
became a nuclear weapon state according to Article II of the NPT.
The following section of this essay will make three cuts at explaining
the 1972 decision, and why in the light of new information available in
1974, it was not reversed. Applying the rational actor, the cybernetic
and the cognitive theories of decision to this time period will allow
greater comprehension of the three theories and a clearer understanding
of the events leading up to the 1974 test.
In order to evaluate the rationality of the events leading up to
the 1974 test, it is necessary to reach some tentative conclusions as to
why India should want to detonate a nuclear device. To simplify matters
it will be assumed that the principal benefits which India accrued due to the
77
test were:
1. Greater prestige among Third World -nations, by showing off
India's technological prowess and reinforcing her claimed
independence from/and equality with} industralised states.
2. Uniting Indian popular opinion.
17These were the principal benefits for India following the 1974 test,
and are taken as the goals she hoped to achieve in opting for a test
18
in 1972.
A First Cut: The Rational Actor Explanation
Decisionmakers act in what they regard as the only rational manner.
They must do so in order to retain a degree of consistency, and hence
credibility. The first cut in explaining the 1972 decision to go ahead
with a nuclear test and the subsequent failure to reverse this decision
before May 1974, will apply the Rational Actor Model (RAM) of decision-
making. The first cut, therefore, gives an account of what happened
assuming the involved decisionmakers were behaving according to the code
of rationality demanded by the Analytic Theory.
The Rational Actor Model of decision assumes a single decisionmaker,
a set of hierarchical goals and perfect information. It is necessary,
and acceptable, to relax these stringent conditions so as to apply the
model to the real world. In Indian nuclear decision-making, Mrs.
Gandhi as Prime Minister and Minister for Atomic Energy, with her personal
advisers and advisers from the IAEC,during informal Cabinet discussions,
took the decision to go ahead. The constitutional and personal power
of the Prime Minister in Cabinet, and widespread parliamentary and
public support for a nuclear test encouraged the Cabinet at least to
be seen to be acting together as a unified decision-making body.
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Diagnosis. The lack of a procedure for problem recognition or identification
in the RAM means that the rational explanation can only be used in retros-
pect. The causal explanation requires a starting and a finishing point.
In our case study we must, therefore, assume the positive outcomes achieved
by the 1974 test were indeed those desired by decisionmakers in 1972. While
it remains difficult to rank hierarchically the various goals, they can
in retrospect be identified as greater prestige for India in the Third
World, a sign of India's technological capability reinforcing her claim
of development and independence, and unifying domestic popular opinion
so as to distract Indians from their deteriorating economic and social prob~
19lems.
Perfect information is illusory, but, according to the RAM the processes
of identifying relevant options and revising estimates in the light of
new information must be extensive to enable an adequate evaluation of the
likely consequences of alternatives discussed. The degree to which these
processes can be undertaken concerning nuclear policy in India, a poor
country with other more pressing issues, such as a third of the population
living below the United Nations poverty line, is far less than in a more
I · f ° d fO 20wea thy state possesslng greater resources 0 tlme an lnance. This
may indeed prove to be beneficial as calculations of value trade-offs
will not be so complex. Thus, the failure to delimit adequately the processes
of search and revision is a fundamental weakness of the RAM.
Search. While the benefits achieved by the nuclear test were not India's
only expected goals, they did structure the environment in which an
analytic decisionmaker would have been expected to operate. Because there
are no set limits on the process of search for the analytic decisionmaker,
it is difficult to comprehend what search across all relevant options
would require. The following suggests some areas that may have been
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covered in searching for options to achieve Indian nuclear decisionmakers'
goals in 1972.
The 1960's had been disastrous for India on the international
stage. Nehru had lost control of his cherished non-aligned policy, which
was becoming an institutionalised movement. 2l Defeat by China in 1962,
and the failure to deal with Pakistan in 1965, had led to an Indian
sabbatical from international affairs. As an emerging economic and regional
industrial power, how could India improve her standing among Third World
states?
A more radical stance in international affairs by the largest Third
World industrial power supporting the Third World in an unselfish manner
to achieve parity and overcome inequality on the world stage, was
required. The transfer of technology, goods, or personnel to more needy
countries was one option. Int~rvention in the Bangladesh Liberation War
exemplified another option. More obvious support for a fairer international
economic order, disarmament, and world peace in the international
organisations to which India belonged was another option. A move towards
a more non-aligned policy, relying upon no external power for technological,
economic, military, food or political aid was an option. In the late
1960's India's desire to break free of its considerable reliance upon
Western European and superpower aid appeared more feasible as her economic
position improved. The fourth five year plan announced in 1969 could have
led to such a position. The non-aligned policy followed in the 1950's
and 1960's had resulted in India being closely allied to neither super-
power. Improved e.conomic performance, a more stringent policy of non-
alignment or detonation of a nuclear device were some of the possible
options that might have reflected India as being able to stand alone.
Possible solutions to unite further domestic political op';
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behind the Congress Party are difficult to identify, especially following
the March 1971 election triumphs, and the decisive military intervention
in Bangladesh. Mrs. Gandhi was at the height of popularity in her political
ca·reer.. Perhaps the formation of a national government, the removal of
political corruption, the elimination of poverty, "transistor radios
for all,,,22 or the detonation of a nuclear device could only further
unify Indian mass opinion. It is important to stress that the options
above were not the only possible. ones identifiable in achieving t.he
desired goals. They merely illustrate the analytic decisionmakers' prob-
lem of having no limits on sea~ch--it is especially difficult to delimit
search across relevant options.
Revision. The process of generating and revising estimates of likely
outcomes is no less clear than that of searching for relevant options.
Generating estimates of the likelihood of India's prestige being enhanced
among Third World states by a nuclear test shows the imposed limits of
revision. In 1972, a nuclear test could well have been expected to
increase India's prestige among Third World states. 23 Indian nuclear
decisionmakers correctly interpreted Third World opinion concerning the
weaknesses of the nuclear Ndn~ProliferationTreaty ~nd the desire for an
emerging industrial ahd economic power as leader of the non-aligned.
While this may have been the case in 1972, that led to the initial go.....
ahead decision, it was not so in 1974, when there was still time to cancel
the test. By February 1974, the Indian economy had suffered serious
reverses and India's international prestige was declining due to its
political and social internal problems. The likelihood of improving
India's prestige among Third World states through a nuclear test in 1974
had significantly declined since its "certainty"expected in 1972.
Thus, the failure to define optimal levels of revision, and continually
81
up-date estimates in the light of new information from 1972 to 1974,
weakens the rational explanation of India's nuclear decision-making
during this period.
Evaluation. The rational process of evaluation, a comparative calculation
of costs, benefits and likely consequences of alternatives requires complex
computation of the likely outcomes of each live option. Enhancing
India's prestige among Third World states had to be weighed against the
likely sanctions that could be expected from aid donors. In 1972,
India was soon expecting to be able to stand alone with little help from
Western countries. Hence, the benefit of greater standing in the Third
World would outweigh any sanctions imposed by industrialised states.
By 1974, India's economic problems required renewed western aid and allied
to the reduced likelihood of enhanced Third World prestige, the rational
choice became far less obvious.
Choice. Choosing the best possible option under the circumstances in
optimising the desired outcomes calculated by cost benefit analysis, is
the decision rule used by rational decisionmakers. Arriving at the
conclusion that one policy, a nuclea~ test, could achieve the three goals
outlined above, and comparing these benefits against the principal
costs of the test, was an unlikely feat in 1972. The economic, B.ocial
and political chaos that existed by 1974 would likely make this task
that much more complicated. It must be questioned whether Indian
nuclear decisionmakers were capable of, or willing to, undertake such
calculations.
In 1972, Indian nuclear decisionmakers made an important policy
decision which was not reversed by 1974, in spite of a considerably altered
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operating environment; the rational actor model fails to explain such an
anomaly except as an irrational oversight. It is to the cybernetic and
cognitive explanations that we must now turn to disentangle the complex
irrational" path which led to the May 1974, detonation.
A Second Cut: The Cybernetic Explanation
The cybernetic explanation of decision attempts to overcome the inherent
problems of the Analytic Theory. Individuals alone and within groups
are not causal learners as the RAM suggests: they learn by trial and error
The processes of search, revision and evaluation are often foreshortened
by relying on selective information feedback and programmed operations
The cybernetic account of the decision to go ahead in 1972, suggests
methods by which Indian nuclear decisionmakers bypassed some of the
shortcomings inherent in the Rational Actor explanation.
In 1971 the Sarabhai Nuclear Energy and Space Programme was adopted
by the Indian Government.. The programme called for one botwo nuclear
tests and missile development amongst other things. The long suppressed
bureaucratic inertia of the IAEC required that a political decision be
taken as to whether India should explode a nuclear device. The decision to
go ahead was not irreversible but was a change in policy, although not a
significant one, once the Sarabhai Programme had been adopted. The
detonation of a nuclear device had been a plausible option since Dr.
Bhabha's announcement in November 1965, that India would be capable of
a test within eighteen months. 24 Prime Minister Shastri gave formal
approval for a Subterranean Nuclear Explosion Project in late 1965. 25
Prime Minister Gandhi cancelled the SNEP in 1966 on assuming office.
Diagnosis. Cybernetic decisionmakers are expected to monitor preselected
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and validated indicators. Indian nuclear decisionmakers' reassessment
of the cancellation of the SNEP formed the process of diagnosis. When
it was found that the policy of no nuclear tests was no longer satisfactory,
a new policy had to be prepared.
Search. The cybernetic explanation of the 1972 decision go ahead with
a test expected the programme's consideration of a preselected number of
variables. Essentially, therefore, the process of search consisted of
questioning why the SNEP had been cancelled. The purpose of the SNEP
had been preponderantly for military use--India had suffered reverses
in the 1962 Sino-Indian border dispute and the 1965 Indo-Pak war. The
traditional northern threat, China, had detonated a nuclear device in
October 1964. Many Indians demanded that their government do the same;
but the peaceful applications of a nuclear explosion in 1965 were still
uncertain ..
The Tashkent Agreement signed by Prime Minister Shastri before his
death on India's behalf with Pakistan emphasised Indian military and
economic weakness. India could not afford a conventional arms race with
Pakistan and was unsure of winning a nuclear arms race with her. In
addition, she was uncertain of the Chinese response to such a provocative
action. Mao had denounced the bomb as a "paper tiger" and declared his will
to use it if attacked.
The growing Indian nuclear energy programme still depended upon trans'"
fers of technology and raw materials from Western countries A nuclear
test was likely to disrupt such transfers. The Soviet Union, the only
feasible replacement as a donor, was unlikely to be helpful as it strong-
ly favoured the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty then being discussed in the
mid 1960·s. India remained dependent on the West for aid in other areas
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and would not be able to endure possible international sanctions in reta-
liation for its detonation of a nuclear device.
Allied to this was the coming to power of Mrs. Gandhi, a relatively
inexperienced politician in an unfamiliar setting 26 discussing an issue
of which she was uncertain, and doubtingthe benefits it might bring. The
SNEP was cancelled for these reasons, and thus forming the process of search
used in the decision to go ahead in 1972. As J. Stein and R. Tanter
point out: "This simplified search procedure is consistent with constrained
learning; just as human beings learn through trial and error, they also
27
search through trial and error."
Revision. The cybernetic process of revising estimates is incremental;
marginal adjustments are made through a process of trial and error. This
requires that new information received since 1966 from preselected indicators
used for the process of search should be integrated with the reasons why
the SNEP was cancelled. The reasoning behind the decision to cancel in
1966 should be brought up to date incorporating new information resulting
in a revised evaluation of likely outcomes. Only the information
pertinently linked to the reasons for cancellation would be included in
the cybernetic process of revision in 1972.
One of the reasons why the SNEP had been cancelled in 1966 was
because of the uncertain uses of nuclear explosives engineering (NEE).
By 1972, however, there had been a number of NEE projects undertaken by the
superpowers, and hence a considerable advance in the range of applications
28
that NEE might be used for. The Indians chose to label their 1974
test purely peaceful. Another reason for cancellation of the SNEP -~~
1966 was the uncertain effects it might have on the regional status quo.
The Pakistanis questioned the "peacefulness" of the 1974 test and
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labelled it "nuclear blackmail .. n29 However, by 1972, and more so by 1974,
India had modernised its military forces and proven them with the decisive
intervention in the 1971 Pakistan Civil War.. The Pakistani economy was
relatively weak and could not afford a conventional arms race with India;
and, since 1965, had fallen further behind India in nuclear research and
30development
By 1972, the Chinese development of a sophisticated nuclear weapons
delivery system was far beyond that of India's. In a nuclear exchange
with China, India could expect to hit only unpopulated areas using
conventional aircraft, while the Chinese using rockets could wipe out
major centres of population in India. It was unlikely, therefore, that
China would view an Indian nuclear test in 1972 as provocative.. Added
to this, the rule of the Gang of Four in China had caused major internal
disarray and a sUbsequently low profile in international affairs.
In 1966 Indian economic expectations were not great. But the fourth
five year plan announced in 1969 was expected to enable India "to stand
on our own feet as soon as possible and not take a very large amount of
foreign aid" ... "we are doing with less aid because of our own desire
and because less aid is available" declared Mrs. Gandhi. 3l Good
monsoons in the late 1960's had significantly strengthened India's economy.
Further, India at last seemed to be emerging as a major industrial power,
which was reflected by its first plutonium processing plant becoming
operational in 1971. This allowed India to process enriched uranium from
its own unsafeguarded atomic energy reactors for use in plutonium
reactors or for nuclear devices without international inspection.
Essentially, India's nuclear industry had come of age and could operate,
with some difficulty, without Western support. Replacing Western aid
could be possible from the Soviet Union following high level diplomatic
86
exchanges and agreements between India and her socialist superpower friend. 32
The Soviet Union had lost interest in the NPT in the late 1960's and
seemed prepared to aid India s nuclear industry partly to offset her in-
creasingly unpredictable relations with China. The Soviet Union shared
India's suspicions of the Sino-American rapprochement of the early 1970's.
Thus, another barrier preventing the 1966 test was of little hindrance by
1972.
Moving India into the Soviet sphere of influence during the early
1970 s reflected not only Mrs. Gandhi's socialist ideological leanings
but also her determination to lead India Indira's way. This was in marked
contrast to her uncertain approach on assuming office in 1966. In 1972,
Mrs. Gandhi was at the zenith of her domestic and international political
career--she was "mother India"--the negative consequences of a nuclear
test alone could not be expected to change this.
Evaluation and Choice. The cybernetic process of revision, of taking past
operating procedures identified during a limited search process and relying
on the programmed consideration of a preselected number of variables and
integrating them with new information, gives a compelling alternative to the
Rational Actor explanation of India's decision to test a nuclear device.
Evaluation and choice are indelibly linked to the earlier processes of
problem identification and search. The Sarabhai Programme had called
for at least one nuclear explosion; decisionmakers were required to update
the 1966 cancellation of the SNEP. By revising the estimates against
a nuclear test arrived at in 1966 and integrating new pertinent information,
there no longer appeared any reason not to detonate a nuclear device if need
be. This option now satisfied the avoidance of the various disasters
that had been envisaged by decisionmakers cancelling the SNEP in 1966.
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The cybernetic explanation of the go ahead decision given in 1972 for
a nuclear test is plausible if we isolate the event. However, the
following two years saw a dramatic change in India's domestic political
situation and her international position. The February 15, 1974 final
33decision to go ahead was-taken in a very different climate from some
two years before. The incremental process of revision involved in the
cybernetic explanation was no longer so apparent; evaluation of the new
environment should have led to cancellation if preanalysed standard
operating procedures were the only indicator
1972 goals likely to be satisfied.
No longer were all the
The intended purpose of the test remained peaceful according to Indian
official pronouncements. Pakistan, while still smarting from its defeat
in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, was still incapable of matching India
either in a conventional or nuclear arms race. Yet, the recognition of
Bangladesh and President Ali Bhutto's visit to former East Pakistan in
February 1974, pointed towards a renewed effort by Pakistan to win
regional allies. It also won international approval, especially from
Western arms-selling states. Although Sino-American rapprochement
continued, the internal disarray in Chinese politics in 1974 was increasing-
ly ensuring a muted, if any, criticism of an Indian nuclear test from
Peking.
One important factor to consider at the time was that India had
drifted into the Soviet sphere of influence. The 1971 Siml,a Agreement
allowed India to gain economic and technical support from the Soviet
Union. This became much needed following a poor monsoon in 1972, and
the effects of the oil crisis on the rapidly deteriorating Indian economy.
The fourth five year plan announced in 1969 was failing; India would not
be able to stand alone and inevitably looked to the West for aid. The
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Indian economy's poor performance was reflected by cuts in the Sarabhai
Programme's 1973-74 budget, bringing it below that of 1971-72. Work fell
behind schedule ..
The State of Emergency introduced during the 1971 war with Pakistan
had not been lifted by 1974. Political opposition to Mrs .. Gandhi
following, and in spite of, her convincing electoral successes in March
1971, continued.. Raj Narain's claims of electoral irregularities by
Congress, particularly in Mrs .. Gandhi's constituency/and the J .. P. Move-
ment, spearheaded political opposition to Mrs. Gandhi ..
The consequences of a nuclear test in 1974 were likely to be far less
favourable than those envisaged two years previously. Although India
still remained secure in the South Asia context, a resurgent Pakistan
with international support, plus evident internal political and economic
difficulties reduced India's international power and prestige. The
satisfactory avoidance of all disasters feared in 1966, that led to the go
ahead decision in 1972, no longer existed by February 1974. Because value
trade-offs are limited by the cybernetic process of decision, and the
fact that the desired goals although different from those two years previous,
were not met in 1974, suggests the nuclear test would have been cancelled
if cybernetic explanation was complete. Only by including the thoughts
and beliefs of importantdecisionmakers can we understand why the 1974 test
did go ahead.
A Third Cut: The Cognitive Explanation
The success of the cybernetic explanation relies upon a highly
structured appropriately arranged environment. Constructing such a
simplistic picture is not easy bearing in mind the inherent complexities
of the modern state. It is even more unrealistic when analysing India--
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a highly fractured society which became a state so shaped by the pattern
of Whitehall bureaucracy. Secondly the cybernetic explanation fails to
include the human mind s ability to make inductive inferences on its own
initiative. Problem construction and problem solving involve the
human mind and/therefore/the structure of human belief systems must
be accounted for. By early 1972, perceptions of India's domestic
and external situation had changed from those of 1966; so much so, that
a nuclear test could once again be considered. The cognitive model
attempts to explain why this change of perception had occurred and why
the go ahead decision given in 1972, was not reversed in light of new,
apparently contradictory evidence by 1974.
1971 had seen India gain an impressive military victory in the
third Indo-Pakistan War. In March of the same year, Mrs. Gandhi as
leader of Congress, came of age with an impressive electoral victory in
Federal elections. Furthermore, the Indian economy was flourishing, one
result being the announcement of the extensive Sarabhai Nuclear Energy
and Space Programme. The optimism of decisionmakers for the future of
India allowed for the decision to go ahead with a nuclear test which would
confirm India's industrial power and her desired position as the economic,
technological and ideological leader of the Third World. The negative
consequences of the test were minimal and would be considerably off set
by the expected positive outcomes, as perceived in 1972. By 1974, the
Indian economy was again in deep recession, Congress was at its lowest
popularity rating since Independence, and internationally India again
looked like an impoverished Third World country. In May 1974 a nuclear
test occurred in the Rajastan Desert. Why, in light of the events since
1972, had the test gone ahead?
90
Diagnosis. On February 15, 1974, a political decision was taken by Mrs.
Gandhi and senior atomic personnel to detonate a device on May 18 1974.
The problem seemed to be a black and white one: either detonate or
do not detonate. The cognitive explanation requires an account of what
were the relevant issues that shaped the decisionmakers prevalent
beliefs. Essentially, they were Indira Gandhi s domestic position and
India's economic and international position. Bearing these two points
in mind we can see how Mrs. Gandhi, principally, and her advisers decided
India should become a member of the nuclear weapons states club (as defined
by the
Search and Revision. The J.P. Movement and Raj Narain's charge of electoral
irregularities during the March General Elections to the Lok Sabhya
highlighted the crumbling political consensus that Mrs. Gandhi had enjoyed
in 1971. However, the political chaos in the North Eastern states,
Naga1and, Manipur and the territory of Mesoran, and the failing economy
served to worsen Mrs. Gandhi's position. Failure of the 1972 monsoon and
the inflationary effects of the 1971 war with Pakistan reversed the positive
effects of four good monsoons in the late 1960's and "laid bare the weak-
ness of the Congress Administration and Gandhi's own ideology and policies. 35
For a number of reasons, including the fact that the economic situation
in India failed to improve in 1973, the oil crisis of 1973-74 affected
India more severely than most countries.
The oil crisis caused serious economic concern which was not reduced
by the increasingly uncertain' security position perceived by Mrs. Gandhi
for India. The American withdrawal from South East Asia and its search
for new allies in the area to prevent a "domino" series of victories
to the Soviet block, and the Sino-American rapprochement were undesirable
" dh" , -" d 36ln Mrs. Gan 1 s mln •
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The undignified withdrawal from South East Asia by the u.S. following
the 1973 Agreements signed with North Vietnam, increased American
determination to maintain a major military capability in the Indian Ocean
with the development of a naval base at Diego Garcia, one thousand miles
to the south of India. Allied to this the United States rapprochement
with the Peoples Republic of China begun by Henry Kissinger s secret contacts
with Chinese personnel in the early 1970 s compounded Mrs. Gandhi s
perception of encirclement by the u.s. and its allies. The arrival of
the American Task Force in the Bay of Bengal during the In~o-pakistan
Wa,r triggered this perception. 37 The improved Indo-Soviet relations during
the early 1970's was not to be solely relied upon, as it remained India's
policy for the superpowers not to spread their confrontation to the sub-
continent. The resumption of U.S. aid to Pakistan, suspended in the
aftermath of the 1965 Into-Pakistan War, looked likely in 1974; especially
with Pakistan's recognition of, and establishing diplomatic relations with,
Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan.
Evaluation. We can see, therefore, that if Mrs. Gandhi perceived domestic
turmoil and growing economic and security problems to be increasing, the
process by which she reviewed information received since her 1972 go
ahead decision coincided with her dominant beliefs in February, 1974. This
is the key dynamic of the cognitive model: the ability of individuals
to draw inferences from supportive information alone, allowing for sharp
oscillation from low probability to certainty in the process of revising
estimates. The need to achieve political consensus, before serious
efforts at overcoming India's economic problems could be attempted, and
a fear of military encirclement, reinforced Mrs. Gandhi's thinking on a
nuclear test.
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Choice. In this case study a lexicographic decision strategy is apparent
(all remaining alternatives were considered, but with only one goal in
mind) in which Mrs. Gandhi chose that option which best discriminated
among rank-ordered dimensions of value. Thus the need to ensure an
"independent" India through strong political leadership shaped Mrs.
Gandhi's thinking concerning a nuclear test in
of Emergency Rule in June 197
and indeed Declaration
Prime Minister Gandhi's belief system, as the central nuclear policy
maker, can be seen as an important influence on the decision-making
process that immediately preceeded the test. Mrs. Gandhi's control of
the process is exemplified by the fact that the Defence Minister was not
informed of the test until eight days prior and the External Affairs
• I "I d b f 38Mlnlster untl two ays e ore the test.
Shaping the problem and searching for options within the parameters
of Mrs. Gandhi's belief system, revising by deductive and categorical
inferences and the limited process of evaluation, emphasise the importance
of the cognitive theory in Indian nuclear decision-making.
Prime Minister Gandhi's perceptions, at the centre of the Indian
political system, of events around her undoubtedly left their mark on the
nuclear policy environment in India during the period 1972 to 1974.
A Fourth Cut: How Rational Was Mrs. Gandhi?
Stein and Tanter's Constrained Rationality Model (Model V) em-
phasises an individual's ability to synthesise the analytic and cognitive
elements in a single process of choice. The final cut attempts to synthesise
the rational actor, cybernetic and cognitive explanations of India's
decision to explode a nuclear device, and in retrospect asks to what
degree Mrs. Gandhi's thought processes were correct.
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Diagnosis. The process of diagnosis is used in the cognitive explanation:
37
"perception of a stimulus for decision is filtered through belief systems."
Mrs. Gandhi saw the growing domestic social political and economic
turmoil and the threat to India's national security of encirclement by
the u.s. and its allies. This was a threat not only to her political
position, but also to the Indian constitution and thus the continued
I d" 38eXlstence of an autonomous In lao
Search. Something was required by 1974 to stop the rot from spreading
to other parts of the political system, and to assert India's status as
an autonomous regional power. To solve such problems, the number of options
were limited. The decision taken two years previously to proceed with a
nuclear test programme needed to be confirmed for a test in May 1974.
The expected gains in 1972 of confirming India's technological prowess
and economic stability were no longer to be expected, but bureaucratic
inertia had ensured the test programme continued. In February 1974, Mrs.
Gandhi was required to make a political decision as to whether the test
should occur. Thus, an option that could possibly overcome the internal
and external threats to Indira's and India's position, as perceived by
Mrs. Gandhi, offered itself in the form of a nuclear test. There were
probably other options at the time, including the possibility of declaring
a state of Emergency.
Revision. The cognitive explanation argues that once an option has been
identified as overcoming the perceived problems, information integrated
to estimate its chances of success would only be supportive. While this
was the case to a great exten~ (for example, expected increased prestige
in the Third World and Indian popular support), the adverse effects of
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a nuclear test were also realised. The likely reactions of India's neigh-
bours particularly China and Pakistan, were uncertain, as were the res-
ponses of India s western aid donors and partners in nuclear development.
Thus, estimating the likely outcomes of a nuclear test although largely
dependent upon confirming information probably included attempts to under-
stand the possible negative repercussions.
Evaluation. The political fallout of the test was uncertain--Mrs. Gandhi's
and India's position could either be strengthened or :weakened. The
calculation of the costs and benefits to Indira and India of the test were
likely extensive. Yet, dealing with a complex issue with possible
unforeseeable consequences was going to be constrained by the decision-
makers' perceptions, as they are in any cost-benefit calculation.
Choice. The option chosen, a nuclear test, could best be expected to
overcome the problems perceived by Mrs. Gandhi, with the least expected
negative consequences. A process of choosing that option which was
expected by Mrs. Gandhi39 to overcome India's problems as she perceived
them.
The extent to which Mrs. Gandhi correctly interpreted her operating
environment reflects the unstable structure of Indian society in the mid
1970's. Overcoming the very real internal chaos in India during this
time could only have been achieved by real political, economic and social
reforms. A nuclear test, however widely supported, was never going to
remove the structural problems inherent in India at the time.
Events in the Indian Ocean were unlikely to offer much comfort to
a Prime Minister in Delhi ruling over a rapidly crumbling consensus.
Renewed American arms shipments to Pakistan, Sino-U.S. rapprochement, and
a u.s. naval base constructed at Diego Garcia caused much speculation in
Delhi as to American intentions in South Asia. Yet, an Indian nuclear
deterrent was unlikely to alter American intentions, whatever they might
have been. A more certain deterrent would have been closer alignment
to the Soviet Union.
The test was widely acclaimed throughout India and the Third World,
but as a means of overcoming the inherent problems of India in 1974, the
te l5.t was not a great success. The development of nuclear technology
continues in India today, but it is uncertain as to where this will lead:
"not yet through .. "
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Conclusion
This essay has examined three theories of decision (the Analytic,
Cybernetic and Cognitive), and their usefulness in explaining a particular
event--in this case India's nuclear policy.
In reviewing the literature and testing the theories of decision-
making in the Indian nuclear policy process, the various weaknesses and
strengths of each theory have been highlighted. When the strengths
of each theory were synthesised, the Constrained Rationality Model offered
a more complete explanation. The constrained rationality approach is
-labelled a Model, rather than a Theory because it has many variations,
and no set guidelines as to which should be used in any particular
situation.
Chapter III took a macro-perspective and a micro-perspective of the
events leading up to India's nuclear test in May 1974. The macro-perspective
suggested a disjointed incremental explanation of the decision-making
process. Change or progress by small steps characterised the first three
decades of Indian nuclear decision-making. The bureaucratic momentum of
the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), especially during the period
of leadership by Dr. Bhabha until his death in 1966, ensured that India
remained at the forefront of nuclear technological developments.
Nehru's preoccupation with other affairs of state enabled the IAEC
to become a state within a state. Prime Minister Shastri on coming to
office was influenced by public opinoin in deciding in favour of a nuclear
test in 1965. Mrs. Gandhi's decision to cancel the SNEP in 1966, although
politically weak, was made possible by the IAEC being in a state of
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disarray since Dr. Bhabha's death. From a macro-perspective then, a
constitutionally strong Prime Minister unsure of him/herself and strongly
influenced by public opinion and a determined IAEC or an influential
and popular Prime Minister keeping the IAEC in check characterised the
first three decades of Indian nuclear decision-making. That is: muddling
along.
A micro-perspective, in this case 1972-74, suggests a different
explanation. The Indian political system enables the ascendant belief
system of a popular Prime Minister to prevail on important issues. The
perceptions of Prime Minister Gandhi did not significantly alter between
1972 and 1974, although the environment in which she operated had changed
considerably. A constrained optimising decison-rule was apparent.
Our case study offers two alternative explanations of the final
decision to go ahead with a test: muddling along and constrained opti-
mising. While the incremental account offers no explanation for prediction,
neither does the Constrained Rationality Model offer guidelines as to which
process should be used and when. Where, then, does this leave the study
of decision-making? Is decision-making as a scholarly area of investigation
redundant?
This essay suggests not. The decision-making processes used in the
macro- and micro- explanations in th~s study offer no guidelines in pre-
dicting decision-making processes and outcomes. But, as any social
scientist realises, prediction is a hazardous business. Decision-making
theory does, however, offer some guidelines as to how individuals might
react in the future based on their beliefs and past actions. But more
importantly, studying the process of decision allows an observer to under-
stand more fully an event than might otherwise be the case.
India exploded a nuclear device on May 18, 1974. This fact does not
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tell us who were the decisionmakers that decided in favour of a test, how
they were influenced by their operating environment, or what influence
the individualsl beliefs had on the decision-making process Only by
integrating these factors within the various approaches to decision-
making can one arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the
rationale behind India's nuclear test. In so doing we enhance our
broader understanding of the complex processes by which individuals
and governments decide.
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as a unified buffer state. The external threat from the Soviets
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Pakistan), Burma, Nepal, Tibet and the island of Sri Lanka. The
impossibility of policing the border with Bangladesh has led to
great population flows into India. This has occurred mainly in
West Bengal, an area whose population has many historic ties with the
Moslem population of Bangladesh. India has an interest in main-
taining the territorial independence of Nepal as a buffer state
against the P.R.C. The Tamil: ,s in Sri Lanka have cultural bonds to
~
their mainland cousins. There have been suggestions that India has
encouraged the present internal disharmony within Sri Lanka.
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p. 21452. Vertzberger suggests that Chinese fears of Soviet penetra-
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to initiate a military assistance programme with Pakistan in 1966.
See R. Wirsing, "The Arms Race in South Asia: Implications for
the United States" in Asian Survey, Vol XXV, No.3 (March 1985),
p. 276.
5. Defence Minister Chavan quoted in F.T.J. Bray and M.L. Moodie,
"Nuclear Politics in India" in Survival (May/June 1977), p. 111 ..
6. Good monsoons in the late 1960's had established a firm base for
economic development.
7. Pakistan has charged that the Awambi League, East Pakistan's leading
sec essionistparty, had been working in collusion with Delhi since
1964( See Keesings Contemporary Archives, Vol. XVIII, May 15-22,
1971, pp. 24597-24598.
8. Quoted in F.T.J. Bray and M.L. Moodie, "Nuclear Politics in India,"
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p. 113.
9. "India's military advantage over Pakistan ... is in no real danger
of being overt.urned. IV R. Wirsing, "The Arms Race in South Asia:
Implications for the United States," p. 289.
10. D.S.-Pak relations had been strained by the Americans' suspension
of arms shipments to Pakistan in late 1965. The problem worsened
when the U.S.A. failed to give Pakistan concrete support during the
1971 Indo-Pakwar The arrival of the U.S.S. Enterprise in the Bay
of Bengal during the 1971 war was probably a symbolic gesture, and
perhaps as a deterrent to the Chinese siding with Pakistan.
11. A similar explanation was given by Peking for its border war with
Vietnam in 1979.
12. For example, CENTO and SEATO. CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation)
was established in 1955 and insured American and British defense
support for Pakistan, Iran, Iraq (left in 1959) and Turkey. SEATO
(Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation) grew out of the Southeast Asia
Collective Defence Treaty established in 1954. Sponsored by the
United states, its primary function was to contain the spread of
Communism in Southeast Asia. Much the same purpose as N.A.T.O.,
its members were largely dependent on U.S. aid. It effectively
ended its tenuous existence in 1977.
13. F.T.J. Bray and M.L. Moodie, "The Arms Race in South Asia: Implications
for the United States."
14. The Times (London), May 20, 1974.
15. "Indian nonalignment is nothing but a strategy of being engaged in
power politics but of doing so preferably through diplomacy, given
India's military and economic weaknesses. A. Kapur, India's Nuclear
Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision-MaJ.cing (Praeger ,'1976), p. 27.
By nonaligned, Nehru envisaged a responsive cohesive and dynamic col-
lection of states, but following the 1962 N.A.M. Meeting, steps were
taken to institutionalise the policy into a movement. Thus, it has
lost much of its original purpose as a dynamic foreign policy
alternative of positive neutralisation.
16. Nehru foresaw this as early as 1950. Ibid., p. 52.
17. And prevent the "domino" theory collapse ,of friendly governments in
South Asia.
18. This became virtually impossible following increased American arms
shipments to Pakistan in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
in 1979. India, in order to maintain her conventional military
superiority over Pakistan, was dependent upon Soviet arms. There
have been, suggestions that the recent spy scandal in India was asso-
ciated with the arms procurement department of the Indian Government.
Apparently, the fact that 70 percent of Indian arms are supplied by
the Soviet Un~on is partly due to a Soviet agent being in charge of
Indian weapons procurement, and not because of India being a virtual
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satellite of the Soviet Union.
19. China, in contrast, has spent most of the past 2,500 years as a unified
state with little interference from external powers. However, China
has yet to take any steps towards removing governments which are not
democratically elected.
20. The Indian National Congress was established in 1885 to press for
reforms in the British Raj. Since then, in spite of many splits, it
has dominated the Indian political system It was the main group
pressing tor an Independent India, and almost inevitably formed the
first government after the British withdrew. Although it has divided
on many occasions, the faction that has included the Nehru dynasty has
always dominated. Rajiv Gandhi's ruling party in 1985 is the Congress
(I), ("I" for Indira)
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Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision-Making (p. 198) conclusion
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32. Specifically the Simla Agreement signed between India and the Soviet
Union. Treaty signed in August, 1971 provided for cooperation between
the two nations, especially in economic and technical fields.
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40 .. J. Stein and R .. Tanter, op .. cit., p .. 66 ..
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